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Abstract
Current literature holds that many cognitive functions can be performed outside
consciousness. Evidence for this view comes from unconscious priming. In a typical
experiment, visual stimuli are masked, such that participants are close to chance when
directly asked to which of two categories the stimuli belong. This close-to-zero
sensitivity is seen as evidence that participants cannot consciously report the category
of the masked stimuli. Nevertheless, the category of the masked stimuli can indirectly
affect responses to other stimuli (e.g., reaction times or brain activity). Priming is
therefore seen as evidence that there is still some (albeit unconscious) sensitivity to the
stimulus categories, thereby indicating processing outside consciousness. Although this
“standard reasoning of unconscious priming” has been used in many studies, we show
that it is flawed: Sensitivities are not calculated appropriately, thereby creating the
wrong impression that priming indicated better sensitivity than the close-to-zero
sensitivity of the direct discrimination. We describe the appropriate way to determine
sensitivities, replicate the behavioral part of a landmark study, develop a method to
estimate sensitivities for published studies from reported summary statistics, and use
this method to reanalyze 15 highly influential studies. Results show that the
interpretations of many studies need to be changed and that a community effort to
reassess the vast literature on unconscious priming is needed. This process will allow
scientists to learn more about the true boundary conditions of unconscious priming,
thereby advancing the scientific understanding of consciousness.
Keywords: consciousness, unconscious priming, reanalysis, indirect task
advantage, signal detection theory
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The unconscious priming fallacy: When can scientists truly claim an
indirect task advantage?
Research on consciousness and its cerebral substrates has far-reaching implications
and received substantial attention in recent years (Michel et al., 2019). A driving factor
have been reports that masked stimuli that are not consciously perceived can
nevertheless affect behavioral responses and brain activity (Kouider & Dehaene, 2007;
van den Bussche, van den Noortgate, & Reynvoet, 2009). The exciting claim here is
that unconscious processing might be more than a mere residue of conscious processing
and may be performed by different neuronal processes than conscious processing. Such
results impact current theories about the functional role of consciousness (Dehaene,
Lau, & Kouider, 2017; Kouider & Dehaene, 2007; van den Bussche et al., 2009; Sklar et
al., 2012; Hassin, 2013), might suggest parallel neuronal routes for unconscious vs.
conscious processing (Morris, Öhman, & Dolan, 1999), and might support theories of
superior unconscious processing (Custers & Aarts, 2010; Dijksterhuis, Bos, Nordgren, &
Van Baaren, 2006; ten Brinke, Vohs, & Carney, 2016).
Here, we scrutinize one of the most frequently used approaches in this field, which
we dub the standard reasoning of unconscious priming. We show that this
reasoning is flawed for mathematical reasons, fails to provide meaningful interpretation
of the data, and needs to be replaced by a more appropriate analysis. Because many
studies have used the standard reasoning, a large body of literature needs reassessment.
This has the potential to drastically change our views on the relationship of conscious
vs. unconscious processing and their neuronal underpinnings. The fallacy affects a wide
range of research areas because the standard reasoning has been employed on such
diverse topics as, for example, unconscious processing of semantic meaning (Dehaene et
al., 1998), motivation (Pessiglione et al., 2007), emotion (Morris, Öhman, & Dolan,
1998), cognitive control (van Gaal, Ridderinkhof, Scholte, & Lamme, 2010), and
detection of liars (ten Brinke, Stimson, & Carney, 2014).
To assess how seriously the literature is affected, we have proceeded in three
strands: (a) We replicated the behavioral part of a landmark study (Dehaene et al.,
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1998) and show that the appropriate analysis of the data does not support unconscious
priming (in contrast to the claims of the original study). (b) We developed statistical
methods to reanalyze published studies based on the published t and F statistics
(because access to the full trial-by-trial data is often lacking). We validated this
approach, for example, by showing that our reanalysis of the published data of Dehaene
et al. (1998) is consistent with the results of our replication. (c) We used our methods
to reanalyze 15 highly influential studies (with a total of 3277 citations in Web of
Science). Even though all these studies used the standard reasoning to infer
unconscious processing, their data tell a different story.
The standard reasoning of unconscious priming
Before describing our newly developed methods and results we need to describe
the standard reasoning and why exactly it is so problematic.
Illustrative example: Unconscious lie detection
As an illustrative example, consider the study by ten Brinke et al. (2014) who
reported that humans can detect liars better unconsciously than consciously.
Participants first watched videos of suspects who were either lying or telling the truth.
Then participants performed two tasks. In the direct task, they viewed pictures of the
suspects and judged who had been lying or telling the truth. Participants performed
poorly with an accuracy of only 49.62%-correct (with chance level being 50%).
In the indirect task, participants categorized words, such as “deceitful” or
“honest”, into the categories lying or truth–telling. Before each word, a masked picture
of a suspect was flashed. In consequence, participants’ reaction times (RTs) were faster
when congruent stimuli were presented (e.g., a lying suspect before a lie–related word)
as compared to incongruent stimuli. Based on this congruency effect, ten Brinke et al.
(2014) concluded that the indirect task indicated relatively good accuracy for the
discrimination between truth–tellers and liars and that this sensitivity was better than
that in the direct task: “indirect measures of deception detection are significantly more
accurate than direct measures” (p. 1098, Abstract).
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Before we proceed, let us stress two things here: (a) Up to this point, ten Brinke
et al. (2014) attempted to compare only performances in the direct and indirect tasks,
independent of considerations of which task is measuring conscious or unconscious
processes. We will call this more descriptive phase of the inference Step 1 of the
standard reasoning in the following. (b) ten Brinke et al. (2014) inferred that the
accuracy in the indirect task was better than in the direct task. We will use the purely
descriptive term indirect task advantage (ITA) to refer to a situation with a higher
accuracy (or, more generally, sensitivity) in the indirect as compared to the direct task.
Based on their claim of an ITA, ten Brinke et al. (2014) proceed to interpret this
ITA with relation to conscious vs. unconscious processing (we will call this more
interpretative phase of the inference Step 2 of the standard reasoning in the following):
They assume, that the direct task measured mainly conscious processes (because it was
essentially a report of what participants believe), while the indirect task measured
mainly unconscious processes (because the masked pictures were hardly consciously
seen by the participants, as confirmed by an additional control experiment in which
participants had to determine whether the masked suspects were male or female).
Based on these assumptions, ten Brinke et al. (2014) relate the direct task to conscious
and the indirect task to unconscious processing, thereby attributing the supposed ITA
from Step 1 to superior unconscious processing: “although humans cannot consciously
discriminate liars from truth tellers, they do have a sense, on some less-conscious level,
of when someone is lying” (p. 1103) and “the unconscious mind identifies and processes
cues to deception (to the extent that they are available) more efficiently and effectively
than the conscious mind.” (p. 1104).
However, ten Brinke et al. (2014)—and the standard reasoning in
general—inferred an ITA (i.e., better accuracy in the indirect than in the direct task)
although they never calculated an accuracy for the indirect task. They only showed
that there was a congruency effect on RTs in this task. We will show that even a very
clear and highly significant congruency effect is not indicative of good accuracy (or,
more generally, sensitivity).
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Because ten Brinke et al. (2014) laudably followed an open-data policy, Franz and
von Luxburg (2015) were able to reanalyze these data and to assess how much evidence
the congruency effect truly provided for relatively good accuracy in the indirect task.
Their argument went as follows: If the congruency effect is supposed to indicate
relatively good accuracy for deception detection, then we must be able to
use the corresponding data to determine who of the suspects is lying.
Otherwise the data cannot provide evidence for relatively good accuracy in the indirect
task.
To assess this, Franz and von Luxburg (2015) determined statistically optimal
classifiers, used the RTs of the indirect task to classify (“predict” in the nomenclature of
statistical learning) who of the suspects were lying, and found the accuracy of the
indirect task to be only at 50.6%-correct (SEM = 0.3%; see below for more details on
the methods used). This value is very similar to and not significantly different from the
accuracy in the direct task (49.62%-correct; SEM = 1.4%). Therefore, ten Brinke et al.
(2014)’s inference in Step 1 was flawed: The data did not provide evidence for better
accuracy in the indirect than in the direct task: There was no ITA. Because the
existence of an ITA in Step 1 is a necessary condition for Step 2, these inferences about
unconscious vs. condition processing were also not warranted.
General description of standard reasoning
Let us now describe the standard reasoning (and its fallacy) in a more general
way. The typical unconscious priming paradigm encompasses two tasks. In the direct
task, participants are presented with masked stimuli belonging to one of two categories
(labeled A and B in Figure 1a). In each trial, participants perform a binary
discrimination. Performance is measured by the sensitivity index d′ from Signal
Detection Theory (Green & Swets, 1988) or by %-correct. The stimuli are masked such
that performance in the direct task is typically poor (d′ close to zero or %-correct close
to 50%). Because participants directly classify the masked stimulus, this task is called
direct task.
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Figure 1 . Typical study design to infer an indirect task advantage (ITA). (a) In each trial,
prime and target–stimuli are presented. The prime–stimulus is masked such that it appears hardly
visible to the participants. Prime and target can be either from category A or B. In the direct task,
participants discriminate the prime (e.g., decide whether it is from category A or B) and perform
poorly. In the indirect task, the same stimuli are presented and participants judge whether the target is
from category A or B. Now, the prime does clearly influence responses. For example, participants
respond faster if prime and target are from the same category (congruent: A–A, or B–B) than if they
are from different categories (incongruent: A–B, or B–A). Based on this congruency effect, the
standard reasoning infers better sensitivity in the indirect than in the direct task (a situation we
dubbed ITA) and attributes this better sensitivity to unconscious processing. (b) A typical example is
Dehaene et al. (1998): Prime and target stimuli were numbers that were either smaller or larger than
five. In the direct task, participants discriminated the primes and their sensitivity was poor. In the
indirect task, participants classified the targets and showed faster responses and larger lateralization of
brain activity if prime and target were congruent than if they were incongruent. Dehaene et al. (1998)
followed the standard reasoning, inferred an ITA, and concluded that the primes were unconsciously
processed in the absence of conscious awareness.
In the indirect task, the same masked stimuli are shown (in this task often
called “primes”), but participants typically respond to subsequent “target” stimuli
(Figure 1a). As a result, the primes clearly affect responses to the targets. For example,
if the prime is congruent to the target (both from category A or both from B)
participants’ RTs are faster than if they are incongruent (one from category A, one from
B). Or, similarly, brain activity could be different between congruent and incongruent
trials. These congruency effects, are the basis for the following inferences of the
standard reasoning. Because in this task, the influences of the primes are only indirectly
measured (the primes are not task relevant), this task is typically called the indirect
task.
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Figure 2 . Standard reasoning to infer an indirect task advantage (ITA). (a) In the direct
task, the standard reasoning infers from close-to-chance performance that there was poor sensitivity for
the primes, if any at all. (b) In the indirect task, the standard reasoning infers from a clear congruency
effect that sensitivity for the primes was relatively good. Based on this pattern of results the standard
reasoning makes two inference steps: In Step 1, it incorrectly infers that participants’ responses in the
indirect task were more sensitive to the primes than in the direct task (ITA). In Step 2, it attributes
this difference to unconscious processing. However, already Step 1 of this reasoning is flawed because a
clear congruency effect does not indicate good sensitivity. It could be caused by a sensitivity as poor as
(or even worse than) the sensitivity in the direct task! Because Step 1 of the standard reasoning is
independent of any (sometimes contentious) assumptions about conscious vs. unconscious processing,
our critique is also independent of any such assumptions.
From such a pattern of results, the standard reasoning infers unconscious
processing in two steps (Figure 2): In Step 1, it infers that (a) sensitivity for the
primes in the direct task was very poor, if not zero, (b) sensitivity for the primes in the
indirect task was relatively good and, therefore, better in the indirect task than in the
direct task, a situation we dubbed ITA.
In Step 2, the standard reasoning associates the direct task with conscious
processing and—based on the supposed ITA from Step 1—concludes that the primes
have been processed to an extend beyond what participants can consciously report,
such that the primes were processed outside of conscious awareness.
For example, Dell’Acqua and Grainger (1999) summarize the standard reasoning
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like this: “The present work follows the tradition of providing evidence for a
dissociation between direct and indirect effects of unconsciously presented stimuli
(Greenwald, Klinger & Schuh, 1995; Draine & Greenwald, 1998). More specifically, null
effects are sought in direct measures (i.e. where subjects respond directly to the
unconsciously presented stimuli) accompanied by non-null indirect effects (i.e. priming
effects)” (p. B2). Note that an ITA in Step 1 of the standard reasoning is sometimes
only implicitly inferred but it is always necessarily implied when claims on unconscious
processing are made.
In the following sections, we describe why the claims of an ITA in Step 1 of the
standard reasoning is flawed. Note, that our critique is independent of assumptions
about conscious vs. unconscious processing that have to be made in Step 2 and for
which different and sometimes contentious approaches exist (e.g., Eriksen, 1960;
Erdelyi, 1986; Holender, 1986; Reingold & Merikle, 1988; Schmidt & Vorberg, 2006).
This makes our critique very general.
Standard reasoning is flawed and cannot provide evidence for an ITA
The standard reasoning is intuitively very appealing, which seems to be one reason
for its popularity. The colloquial version of the arguments in Step 1 of the standard
reasoning that lead to claims of ITAs goes like this: “Participants have a very hard time
to discriminate the primes in the direct task. They are very close to zero sensitivity and
usually not significantly above chance. Nevertheless we can easily find clear and highly
significant congruency effects in the indirect task. Therefore it seems obvious, that the
indirect task responses are more sensitive to the primes than those in the direct task.”
However, this intuition is misguided. A clear congruency effect could as well be
compatible with an underlying true accuracy in the indirect task of 51%-correct as with
99%-correct. We first demonstrate the problem by using a toy example, then discuss it
in a general setting.
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Toy example with birth weights of babies
In this example, we focus exclusively on the analysis strategies in the direct and
indirect tasks. We show that even if responses in the direct and indirect tasks were
based on the exact same information, the standard reasoning would erroneously infer
that responses in the indirect task were more sensitive than responses in the direct task.
Consider we told participants the birth weights of newborn girls (category A) and
boys (category B) and that participants had no other information about the babies. In
the “direct task”, participants used this weight information to guess whether a baby is a
girl or a boy (girls weigh on average a little less than boys). Due to the large overlap
between the weight distributions (Figure 3a), participants would be correct only approx.
55% of the time, which is a poor performance and close-to-chance level (50%).
Following the standard reasoning, an experimenter would correctly infer a poor
sensitivity when it comes to telling apart baby girls and boys using their weight.
In the “indirect task”, participants performed some response (it does not matter
here which response exactly), and the weight information would somehow affect
participants’ RTs in such a way that a weight of 3500 g led to an RT of 350 ms, 3600 g
to 360 ms, etc. Many baby weights would be presented to the participants and—if
enough samples were presented—the experimenter would eventually find a clear
separation between the mean RTs of the participants to groups of baby girls and boys.
Figure 3b shows this for 3000 observations in each group, which is a typical number of
observations in the indirect task (= number of participants × number of trials per
participant).
Here is the catch: Following Step 1 of the standard reasoning, the experimenter
would interpret this clear separation of mean RTs as evidence that there was a
relatively good sensitivity in the indirect task about whether a baby is a girl or a boy
(Figure 2b)—better than in the direct task. But this inference is wrong, because exactly
the same information was the basis for the responses in both tasks.
Where is the flaw? The problem is that the standard reasoning calculates two
very different things in the direct and indirect tasks: In the direct task, it calculates
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Figure 3 . Toy-example demonstrating fallacy of standard reasoning. We show that responses
in the direct and indirect tasks can be based on the exact same information while nevertheless the
standard reasoning would infer an indirect task advantage (ITA). For better intuition, we chose
real-world data (Janssen et al., 2007): Newborn girls weigh a little less than boys. Consider
participants of a hypothetical experiment knew the weight, but nothing else about the babies. (a) In
the direct task, participants used the weight of an individual baby to guess whether it is a girl or a boy.
The weight distributions overlap heavily leading to poor sensitivity regarding this task (d′true = 0.25;
corresponding to 55%-correct). (b) In the indirect task, consider participants’ reaction times (RTs)
reflected a baby’s weight: A weight of 3500 g corresponded to an RT of 350 ms, 3600 g to 360 ms,
3700 g to 370 ms, etc. Participants would be presented with many babies, and the experimenter would
calculate the mean RTs. In a typical experiment, this would be the average across 10 participants and
300 trials in each condition, which is approximately equivalent to 3000 girls and 3000 boys. These
group means are much less variable than the individual values, such that the experimenter would
obtain a clear separation between the two means (this corresponds to a clear congruency effect in the
priming paradigm). Based on this result, the standard reasoning would erroneously infer that
participants had relatively good sensitivity about whether a baby was a girl or a boy in the indirect
task—better than in the direct task. That is, the standard reasoning would infer an ITA even though
the exact same information created the responses in both tasks.
how good each individual baby can be classified based on the weight information. In the
indirect task, it assesses whether there is a difference in mean responses to groups of
baby girls and boys. These are two very different things and it is a-priori to be expected
that the discrimination at the level of individual babies can be poor while the mean
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responses to a group of babies can nevertheless be clearly separated between the
categories.
Our toy example demonstrates that Step 1 of the standard reasoning is flawed
because it infers ITAs even when there are none. In the next section we will describe
the fallacy more generally.
General description of the fallacy
The main fallacy of the standard reasoning is that it infers an ITA even when the
true sensitivity is exactly the same in the direct and indirect tasks. Consider that the
same, poor information underlied both tasks, represented internally by two normal
distributions with slightly different means. In the direct task, the measured sensitivity
would be close to zero, as is typically found. Nevertheless, the same information can
cause slightly different mean responses in the congruent and incongruent conditions of
the indirect task and those means will be clearly separated when we use enough trials.
This is so because the variability of the means becomes smaller with more observations.
Therefore, a clear congruency effect is not indicative of good sensitivity: It could have
been caused by a good sensitivity (corresponding to, say, d′ = 5 or 99%-correct) as well
as by a very poor sensitivity (say, d′ = 0.05 or 51%-correct). Not recognizing this is the
main fallacy of the standard reasoning.
To see this, consider what happens if we increased the number of trials (be it by
increasing the trials per participant or by increasing the number of participants). The
direct task sensitivity will only be measured more precisely but will keep estimating the
true, poor sensitivity. In contrast, the indirect task’s congruency effect becomes clearer
as the mean distributions become more separated (due to the variability of the means
becoming smaller).
To overcome this fallacy, we would need to estimate sensitivity in both tasks in a
similar way. Our analyses will do this by estimating in both tasks the separation of the
underlying distributions relative to the standard deviation at a single trial level (this
corresponds to the well–known sensitivity index d′ from Signal Detection Theory; Green
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& Swets, 1988). However, before being able to describe the appropriate analysis, we
need to discuss some details related to the fallacy of the standard reasoning.
True zero–sensitivity in direct task. Consider the true sensitivity in the
direct task were known to be indeed exactly zero and there were at the same time a
clear congruency effect in the indirect task. In this case (and only in this case), we
could indeed justify the claim that the indirect task were somehow more sensitive than
the direct task. This is so, because any—even minutely—positive sensitivity required to
produce the congruency effect is larger than zero. However, there are a number of
problems with this scenario: (a) It is unrealistic. Typically studies either find some
small, residual sensitivity in the direct task or they do not find a clear congruency
effect. (b) The sensitivity in the indirect task could still be so low, that it would be
close–enough to the zero sensitivity of the direct task to not allow for strong conclusions
(e.g., consider a sensitivity that corresponded to 50%-correct in the direct task and to
51%-correct in the indirect task). (c) If we take into account that the sensitivity in the
direct task always needs to be measured (and therefore is affected by measurement
error), we would still need to establish that the sensitivity in the indirect task is indeed
larger than that in the direct task (e.g., by a significance test on the difference, as is
performed by our more appropriate methods but not by the standard reasoning).
The role of significance testing. Until now, we purposefully did not talk
much about statistical significance testing because we wanted to focus on the main
fallacy of the standard reasoning. This fallacy is independent of details of significance
testing. Significance testing can be seen as only a tool to establish that there is a “clear
congruency effect” or that a sensitivity is “close to zero”. Because significance testing
and its applications have been heavily—and often rightfully—criticized since the very
inception of the concept (Boring, 1919; Morrison & Henkel, 1970; Dienes, 2011;
Cumming, 2014), it might be tempting to attribute the main fallacy of the standard
reasoning also to significance testing. However, the main fallacy of the standard
reasoning would persist even if we replaced the significance tests by other methods; for
example, by corresponding Bayesian methods. This is so because the standard
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reasoning asks two very different statistical questions in the direct and indirect tasks.
Simply answering those questions with other statistical methods would therefore not
ameliorate the main fallacy of the standard reasoning. Throughout this article, we
therefore followed a pragmatic approach by using statistical significance testing while
avoiding typical and well–known errors when applying those methods (Cumming, 2014).
Correct uses of significance testing. Many of the studies we analyzed show
problematic uses of significance testing. The main problem is created by an often
underpowered direct task: A non-significant result does not guarantee that the true
sensitivity is zero. There can easily be a poor but above zero sensitivity, which was
undetected due to low statistical power, which is often prevalent in such studies
(Vadillo, Linssen, Orgaz, Parsons, & Shanks, 2020). The congruency effect in the
indirect task can then be the result of this very same, poor sensitivity and nevertheless
reach significance because of typically much higher statistical power in the indirect task.
Therefore, if we are interested in establishing a difference between sensitivities in both
tasks, it does not suffice to evaluate both tasks in isolation. We must test directly
whether there is a difference between the two tasks. Failure to do so can lead to serious
errors (cf. Buchner & Wippich, 2000; Nieuwenhuis, Forstmann, & Wagenmakers, 2011;
and appendix B of Franz & Gegenfurtner, 2008 for another reanalysis showing how
serious these problems can be). We show in the next section how testing for the
difference is an integral part of the appropriate analysis.
Appropriate analysis: Calculate sensitivities and test for difference
We first describe the appropriate analysis, assuming that trial–by–trial data are
available. This is consistent with the analysis used by Franz and von Luxburg (2015).
Then we describe our newly developed method to analyze studies when only summary
statistics are available.
Appropriate analysis when trial–by–trial data are available
The standard reasoning infers differences in sensitivities even when there are none.
The appropriate method must properly compare sensitivities in the direct and indirect
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tasks. The analysis steps for both tasks must be equated such that the calculated
statistics are comparable, followed by a test of the difference between the two tasks.
Similar approaches have been used in previous—albeit very few—studies (Dulaney &
Eriksen, 1959; Klotz & Neumann, 1999; Kunst-Wilson & Zajonc, 1980; Schmidt, 2002;
Franz & von Luxburg, 2015) in accordance with the long standing (but often ignored)
request to use the “same metric” for both tasks (Reingold & Merikle, 1988).
In both tasks, we compute d′ using Signal Detection Theory (Green & Swets,
1988) and test for a difference between the two tasks. In the direct task, participants
typically classify the primes in each trial and a d′ value is computed as it is also often
done in studies using the standard reasoning. In the indirect task, however, the
standard reasoning relies on the congruency effect in continuous measures (e.g., RTs or
brain activity as measured by EEG or fMRI). For a proper comparison, we have to
transform these continuous measures into a classification for each trial. This can be
achieved in different ways, and we suggest to use the optimal classifier for the given
setup. This gives the indirect task the best possible performance thereby increasing the
chances of finding an ITA and making our arguments stronger when we nevertheless do
not find an ITA (Box 1).
Which classifier is best? We have shown that under typical conditions with equal
number of congruent and incongruent trials, the median-split classifier is optimal (Franz
& von Luxburg, 2015; see Appendix C for details and proof). The classification proceeds
as follows: For each participant, we determine the median RT and classify (“predict” in
the nomenclature of statistical learning) all trials with smaller RTs as congruent, and
trials with larger RTs as incongruent. Then we compare these classifications to the true
labels (congruent/incongruent) evaluating for each trial whether the classification was
correct or not, and we then compute a d′ value as in the direct task. Finally, we
compare the d′ values of the direct and indirect task and test for a difference.
Some details: (a) Instead of computing d′ values, the analysis could also be based
on %-correct values. Assuming an unbiased observer predicting both categories equally
often in the direct task, both approaches produce the same results and we later report
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Box 1. Our analysis strategies introduce bias in favor of finding an ITA
In complex analyses as described in this article, there are always certain degrees of
freedom when determining the details of an analysis strategy. For example, we decided
to chose the optimal classifier (that maximizes %-correct) to analyze the indirect task.
This classifier biases our results slightly in favor of finding higher sensitivity in the
indirect task. One reason for this bias is that the classifier makes use of the fact, that in
typical experiments there are as many congruent as incongruent trials (balanced design).
It is not realistic to assume that participants could fully exploit that same knowledge
and accordingly distribute their answers in the direct task.
Throughout this article—when confronted with a choice of analysis strategies—we
chose strategies that favor finding an ITA. This makes our arguments stronger when
we nevertheless do not find an ITA. In our case, this approach is therefore appropriate,
because if a small bias is unavoidable, we chose a bias that works against our own
conclusions. Thereby, we do the opposite of what some of the reanalyzed studies did
because we chose a slight bias against our own conclusion, while some studies chose a
bias in favor of their own conclusions (see Box 2).
If, however, somebody wanted to establish that there is indeed an ITA, then it is
important to be aware that this approach favors finding an ITA, such that we should be
cautious in interpreting the results. Unfortunately, it is not always possible, to invert
the approach, such that one could consistently choose an analysis strategy that favored
finding no ITA. If such conservatives strategies are not available, additional caution
must be exercised when inferring an ITA.
Note, that this is a general problem that affects many analysis strategies in all areas
of the sciences (albeit it is not always made as explicit). The analysis we describe in
this article is, nevertheless, currently the best approach to the question of whether there
exists an ITA in the unconscious priming paradigm and clearly superior to the standard
reasoning.
both measures to foster intuition. (b) Dichotomization of the continuous, indirect
measures will result in a loss of information (Cohen, 1983). However, the direct task
also requires participants to give binary responses. That is, dichotomization is also
forced in the direct task by the experimental design. Since participants plausibly have a
continuous sense (confidence) about a stimulus’s category (Rausch, Hellmann, &
Zehetleitner, 2018; Zehetleitner & Rausch, 2013), the binary response format in the
direct task also results in an information loss. Our approach only equates this
dichotomization. Because we choose the best possible way to dichotomize, we increase
chances of finding an ITA (Box 1). (c) We classify the trials of the indirect task
according to the labels congruent/incongruent and not according to the prime category
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A/B, as is typically asked in the direct task. This is so because studies typically find a
congruency effect between prime and target (and not a mere effect of the prime being in
category A or B). For a comparison to the direct task, we would ideally transform the
congruency classification into a classification of the prime (A vs. B). For simplicity, we
assume an optimal transformation here (without errors). This is plausible, because the
target stimuli are typically fully visible to the participants, such that errors are rare.
Again our approach gives the indirect task the best possible performance, increases the
chances to find an ITA, and makes our argument stronger when we nevertheless do not
find an ITA (Box 1).
Appropriate analysis when only summary statistics are available
Because the standard reasoning to infer an ITA is flawed, many already published
studies on unconscious priming need reassessment. However, the appropriate analysis as
described in the previous section would require full trial-by-trial data. These can be
difficult or impossible to obtain for published studies (Wicherts, Borsboom, Kats, &
Molenaar, 2006). For the older—but nevertheless influential—studies, those data might
not even exist anymore. Therefore, we developed an approach that allows to estimate
the results of the appropriate analysis without access to trial-by-trial data and solely
based on the typically reported statistics. Here, we sketch the central approach of this
analysis; details are given in Appendix D.
The overall aim of this reanalysis is, again, to estimate sensitivities for the direct
and indirect tasks (i.e., to either calculate d′ from Signal Detection Theory or %-correct
assuming a neutral observer). The direct task typically already provides d′ or %-correct
values. In the indirect task, studies typically report t or F values from a repeated
measures design for the congruency effect. For these repeated measure designs, we
derive an estimator for the underlying sensitivity. Since this reanalysis can only use the
reported statistics, there is one free parameter that needs to be estimated: the ratio of
between– vs. within–subject variances, which we denote by q2. We estimated this
parameter based on (a) our own replication experiment (b) an extensive literature
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review, and (c) extensive simulations (see Appendix E). Assuming the largest plausible
value for q2, we again maximize the estimated sensitivity in the indirect task and
therefore increase the likelihood of finding an ITA (Box 1).
Replication of landmark study finds no ITA
We are now equipped with the appropriate tools that allow to analyze typical
settings and tasks that have been investigated in the context of unconscious priming. In
this section, we will focus on one highly influential study on unconscious semantic
priming of numbers (Dehaene et al., 1998). We will first describe the study and how its
conclusions depend crucially on the standard reasoning. Then, we will describe a
replication experiment of the behavioral part of this study and analyze the
trial–by–trial data. In the next section we will then reanalyze the published data of this
study (besides other studies). Overall, we will conclude that the results of our
replication–experiment are similar to those of the original study and that both give
reason to seriously doubt that there is an ITA for semantic priming of numbers as
inferred by Dehaene et al. (1998).
Dehaene et al. (1998) were interested in the question of whether the semantic
meaning of numbers can be processed outside conscious awareness. They employed a
prototypical version of the standard reasoning (Figure 1b): In the direct task,
participants discriminated features of masked numbers and performed poorly (d′ = 0.2;
corresponding to 54%-correct). In the indirect task, participants were again presented
with the masked numbers (now serving as primes), but decided whether subsequent
target numbers were smaller or larger than five. Participants responded app. 24 ms
faster when prime and target were congruent (both larger or smaller than five) than
when they were incongruent (one smaller and one larger than five). Similar congruency
effects were found for brain activity in EEG and fMRI (i.e., larger lateralization of brain
activity in congruent than incongruent trials).
Dehaene et al. (1998) interpreted these results according to the standard
reasoning: In Step 1, they inferred an ITA: larger sensitivity in the indirect task than
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in the direct task: “[participants] could neither reliably report [the prime’s] presence or
absence nor discriminate it from a nonsense string [...] Nevertheless, we show here that
the prime is processed to a high cognitive level.” (p. 597). In Step 2, they argued that
“the prime was unconsciously processed” (p. 597) because participants were at chance
performance in the direct task. Overall, they concluded: “By showing that a large
amount of cerebral processing, including perception, semantic categorization and task
execution, can be performed in the absence of consciousness, our results narrow down
the search for its cerebral substrates” (p. 599). In short, Dehaene et al. (1998) employed
a prototypical version of the standard reasoning to infer an ITA and unconscious
processing; exactly as described above. To assess the validity of these claims, we first
attempted to replicate the behavioral part of that study, later we will reanalyze the
published data of the study.
Disclosures
Data, materials, and online resources. The experimental material, data and
the scripts for the analyses reported in this article will be made available on the Open
Science Framework (OSF), at https://osf.io/kp59h.
Reporting. We report how we determined our sample size, all data exclusions,
and all measures in the study.
Methods
Twenty-four volunteers participated (13 female, 5 left-handed, age range: 19–27
years; M = 21.5, SD = 1.9). All had normal or corrected-to-normal vision, signed
written informed consent and were naïve to the purpose of the experiment. In the
original study, six and seven participants took part in the first and second direct task,
respectively, and 12 participants took part in the indirect task.
We took great care to make stimuli and timings as similar as possible to those of
the original study by Dehaene et al. (1998). Each trial consisted of: fixation cross
(417 ms), forward mask (67 ms), prime (42 ms), backward mask (67 ms), and target
(200 ms). In the original study, those values were: forward mask (71 ms), prime
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(43 ms), backward mask (71 ms), and target (200 ms; cf. Figure 1b). Slight differences
in timing are due to slightly different refresh rates of the monitors used. The prime
duration of 43 ms was chosen by the original authors because it was the longest
duration that produced non-significant results in the direct tasks. Primes and targets
were numbers (1, 4, 6 or 9) that were either presented as digit (e.g., “1”) or word (e.g.,
“EINS”; German for “ONE”). The original study used the same numbers but not in
German. As in the original study, primes and targets could be congruent (both smaller
or both larger than 5) or incongruent (one smaller, one larger). Masks were composed
of seven randomly drawn characters from {a-z, A-Z}. Participants were seated in front
of a monitor (VIEWPixx /3D, VPixx Technologies Inc., Montreal, Canada), effective
refresh rate 120 Hz at a viewing distance of approx. 60 cm in a sound- and
light-protected cabin. In the original study the monitor was a cathode-ray tube (CRT)
with a refresh rate of 70 Hz. Stimuli were presented centrally as white text (69 cd/m2;
character height: 1◦; width: 0.5◦ visual angle; font: Helvetica) on a black background
(0.1 cd/m2). In the original study those luminance values were not specified so that we
chose the most plausible settings for our experiment.
In the direct task, participants classified whether the prime was smaller or larger
than five. We used this particular task because Naccache and Dehaene (2001) argued
that it is “better matched with the [indirect] task” (p. 227). In the original study by
Dehaene et al. (1998), two direct tasks were used, that produced similar results: In their
first direct task, the prime stimulus was omitted in some trials and participants had to
discriminate their presence vs. absence. In the second direct task, the prime stimuli
were replaced by random letter strings and participants had to discriminate between
numbers vs. random strings.
In the indirect task, participants decided as quickly as possible whether the target
was smaller or larger than five; as was the case in the original study. Each participant
performed 256 trials per task, preceded by 16 practice trials in each task. In the original
study, participants performed only 96 and 112 trials in the first and second direct task,
respectively, and 512 trials in the indirect task. We repeated indirect task trials with
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RTs that were too fast (< 100 ms) or too slow (> 1 s). Similarly, the original study
rejected too fast (< 250 ms) and too slow trials (> 1 s). The indirect task was
performed before the direct task (as is common practice in this paradigm) to prevent
participants attending to the prime in the indirect task. In the original study the direct
and indirect tasks were performed by different groups.
Number of participants and trials were chosen to produce a statistical power of
above 95% to find a difference between sensitivities and confirm an ITA if it is there
(see Appendix B). For this power estimation we assumed a true sensitivity of d′true = 0
in the direct task vs. d′true = 0.25 in the indirect task (values based on our reanalysis of
Dehaene et al., 1998, see below). To our knowledge, the original study did not perform
a power analysis. A post hoc power analysis revealed that the original study had a
statistical power of only 46% to find an ITA given that direct and indirect sensitivities
are d′true = 0 and d′true = 0.25, respectively. This low power is due to a small number of
direct task participants and trials.
Results and Discussion
Our analysis proceeded in two strands: First the traditional analysis which forms
the basis for the standard reasoning, then the appropriate analysis.
Traditional analysis. The direct task sensitivity was d′ = 0.26 (SD = 0.27),
t(23) = 4.81, p < .001, corresponding to an accuracy in prime identification of
M = 54.87%-correct (SD = 4.9, t(23) = 4.82, p < .001). This is exactly in the range of
sensitivities Dehaene et al. (1998) found in their direct tasks (d′ = 0.3 in the first and
d′ = 0.2 in the second direct task). For a graphical depiction of these results, compare
the bars corresponding to the direct tasks in Figures 4a and 4b.
Note, however, that our direct task sensitivity is significantly above zero, while
this was not the case in the original study (p > .05). This is so, because we sampled
much more participants and trials than in the original study. Therefore, we had much
higher statistical power. To simulate the lower power of the original study, we discarded
data from participants and trials to match the same number of observations as in the
WHEN CAN SCIENTISTS CLAIM AN ITA? 22
original study: We kept only the first N = 7 participants and the first 112 trials of each
participant. This leads to a non-significant result, d′ = 0.31 (SD = 0.39), t(6) = 2.06,
p = 0.086, as was the case in the original study. Therefore, it is plausible that it was the
low statistical power in the original study (and not the sensitivity being exactly at zero)
that was the reason for the non–significant result in the direct task of the original study.
This interpretation is also corroborated by the fact that we measured numerically
essentially the same sensitivity in this task as the original study.
In the indirect task, the congruent condition yielded faster RTs (M = 445 ms,
SD = 42) than the incongruent condition (M = 457 ms, SD = 37), resulting in a clear
and highly significant congruency effect of M = 12 ms (SD = 11.8), t(23) = 4.95,
p < .001. The correlation of mean RTs in congruent and incongruent conditions across
participants was r = .96, 95% CI [.91, .98]. That is, we found a highly significant
congruency effect on RTs, as did the original study.
There is one potential caveat here, though. Our congruency effect was lower than
that in the original study (12 ms vs. 24 ms, respectively). We will discuss this when we
describe the reanalysis of the published data of Dehaene et al. (1998).
In summary, we found a similar pattern of results as in the original study: A very
poor direct task performance and a clear congruency effect in the indirect task. Based
on this pattern of results many researchers would have applied the standard reasoning
and inferred an ITA.
Appropriate analysis. The appropriate analysis compares sensitivities in
direct and indirect tasks. We have already described in the last section that the direct
task in our experiment yielded a sensitivity of d′ = 0.26 (SD = 0.27), corresponding to
an accuracy of M = 54.87%-correct. For the indirect task, we obtained a sensitivity of
d′ = 0.25 (SD = 0.15), corresponding to an accuracy of M = 54.93%-correct
(SD = 3.03). These values are depicted in Figure 4a. Inspecting the figure shows that
sensitivities for direct and indirect tasks are very similar, as also depicted by the left
bar of Figure 4d. We found virtually no difference between these sensitivities,
M = −0.01 (SD = 0.34), t(23) = −0.2, p = 0.844. The correlation between sensitivities
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Figure 4 . Sensitivities in the Dehaene et al. (1998) paradigm. (a) Results of our replication
study, based on our full trial-by-trial reaction time (RT) data. (b) Results of our reanalysis approach
based on the published statistics for the RT data from Dehaene et al. (1998). (c) Reanalysis results
from digitizing Figure 2b from Dehaene et al. (1998) showing histograms of indirect task’s RT data.
For the comparison, we used the same direct task results as in subfigure (b). Comparing (a)–(c) we see
that our replication closely matches the results of the original study. (d) Difference in sensitivities
between direct and indirect tasks: Neither in our replication study nor in our reanalyses of Dehaene et
al. (1998) there is a significant difference in sensitivities. That is, there is no indication of an ITA. The
reanalysis result from (b) is also shown in the large summary in Figure 5. Error bars indicate 95%
confidence intervals.
in both tasks across participants was r = −.17, 95% CI [−.54, .24]. That is, there is no
indication for an ITA
In conclusion, using the traditional analyses, our results are similar to the typical
pattern of results found by Dehaene et al. (1998) and many researchers would have
inferred an ITA. However, the appropriate method yields no evidence for an ITA: The
sensitivities in both tasks are essentially identical.
Reanalysis of 15 influential studies finds hardly any ITA
After having demonstrated that the problems of the widely used standard
reasoning are indeed serious, we now applied our approach to a sample of 15 highly
relevant studies in the field of unconscious priming.
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Selection criteria for reanalyzed studies
We focused on studies that used the standard reasoning and claimed an ITA.
First, we selected eight studies by hand that are particularly relevant and are based on
the standard reasoning. These studies and their number of citations in Web of Science
(Clarivate Analytics, Philadelphia, U.S.A.) are: Finkbeiner and Palermo (2009, 56
citations), Finkbeiner (2011, 13 citations), Mattler (2003, 76 citations), Pessiglione et al.
(2007, 352 citations), Sumner (2008, 34 citations), van Gaal et al. (2010, 154 citations),
Wang et al. (2017, 0 citations), Wójcik, Nowicka, Bola, and Nowicka (2019, 1 citations),
Second, we searched for English articles in Web of Science with the topic
“unconscious priming”. We selected all studies with more than 150 citations. This
resulted in seven additional studies: Damian (2001, 178 citations), Dehaene et al. (1998,
662 citations), Dehaene et al. (2001, 770 citations), Kiefer (2002, 237 citations), Kunde,
Kiesel, and Hoffmann (2003, 217 citations), Naccache and Dehaene (2001, 214
citations), Naccache, Blandin, and Dehaene (2002, 313 citations). Overall, these 15
studies received a total of 3277 citations. See Appendix F for details on these studies.
Details of analysis when only summary statistics are available
Our reanalysis method estimates sensitivities for direct and indirect tasks. Here,
we sketch the technical details of the analysis. A detailed account with mathematical
derivations is given in Appendix D.
We denote the estimated sensitivities in the direct and indirect tasks by
d′estimated,direct and d′estimated,indirect, respectively. For the direct task, the typically
reported statistics are average d′ or %-correct values. Therefore, our estimate is simply
the measured sensitivity,
d′estimated,direct = d′,
or a well–known conversion of %-correct values to d′ values assuming unbiased observers
(Green & Swets, 1988),
d′estimated,direct = 2Φ−1(%-correct),
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where Φ−1 is the inverse of the normal cumulative density function.
In the indirect task, statistics for the congruency effect are typically reported by t
values from a paired t test or F values from a repeated–measures ANOVA. In this
setting, F values can be translated into t values by |t| = √F . From a t value, we
estimate the sensitivity by
d′estimated,indirect = t · κN,M,q2 with κN,M,q2 =
Γ
(
N−1
2
)
√
N−1
2 Γ
(
N−2
2
)
√
Mq2 + 2
NM
.
where Γ is the gamma distribution. The constant κN,M,q2 corrects for the fact that t
values increase with increasing number of participants (N), increasing number of trials
(M), and that they depend on the ratio of between- and within-subject variance, which
we denote by q2.
The parameter q2 is the only parameter we need to estimate for our approach. It
is reasonable to assume that this ratio is at most q2 = 0.0225 given our replication
study and given an extensive literature review and simulations (see Appendix E).
Assuming the largest plausible value for q2, we again maximize the estimated sensitivity
in the indirect task and therefore increase the likelihood of finding an ITA (Box 1).
From the estimated sensitivities, we compute the difference
d′difference = d′estimated,indirect − d′estimated,direct
and construct a 95% confidence interval using the corresponding standard errors. This
allows to test for an ITA: If the confidence interval lies above 0 (that is, it has the form
[a, b] with a > 0), the reported result is significant and an ITA is confirmed, otherwise
there is not sufficient evidence to claim an ITA. See Appendix B for an extensive
validation of this reanalysis method.
Results and Discussion
We first describe our reanalysis in detail for the study of Dehaene et al. (1998)
and then use the same methods for all the other studies.
WHEN CAN SCIENTISTS CLAIM AN ITA? 26
Damian 
(JEP:HPP, 2001)
Dehaene et al. 
(Nature, 1998)
Dehaene et al. 
(Nat. Neuro., 2001)
Finkbeiner & 
Palermo 
(Psych. Sci., 2009)
Finkbeiner 
(AP&P, 2011)
Kiefer 
(Cog. Brain Res., 2002)
Kunde et al. 
(Cogn., 2003)
Mattler 
(P & P., 2003)
Naccache & 
Dehaene 
(Cogn., 2001)
Naccache et al. 
(Psych. Sci., 2002)
Pessiglione et al. 
(Science, 2007)
Sumner 
(Exp. Psych., 2008)
van Gaal et al. 
(JoNeuro, 2010)
Wang et al. 
(Exp. Psych., 2017)
Wójcik et al. 
(Psych. Sci., 2019)
    Words
    Digits & 
      words
    Words
    Faces & 
      objects
    Words
    Words
    Digits
    Shapes
    Digits & 
      words
    Digits
    Coins
    Lines
    Shapes
    Arrows
    Faces
Direct (E1)
Indirect, RT (E1)
Indirect, error rate (E1)
Direct (E4)
Indirect, RT (E4)
Indirect, ER (E4)
Direct, word vs. digit
Indirect, RT
Indirect, EEG (LRP)
Indirect, fMRI
Direct (E1)
Indirect, EEG, P1 (E1)
Indirect, EEG, N1 (E1)
Direct (E2)
Indirect, RT (E2)
Indirect, fMRI, same−case (E2)
Indirect, fMRI, different−case (E2)
Direct, pc (E1)
Indir., RT, pc (E1)
Direct, pc (E2)
Indirect, RT, pc (E2)
Direct, tc (E2)
Indirect, RT, tc (E2)
Direct (E3)
Indirect, RT (E3)
Direct, 40 ms
Indirect, RT, 40 ms
Direct, semantic (E2)
Indirect, EEG, N400 (E1)
Direct (E1)
Indirect, RT (E1)
Direct (E2)
Indirect, RT, target set (E2)
Indirect, error rate, target set (E2)
Direct (E3)
Indirect, RT, target set (E3)
Indirect, RT, non−target set (E3)
Direct (E4)
Indirect, RT (E4)
Indirect, error rate (E4)
Direct (E5)
Indirect, RT (E5)
Direct (E1)
Indirect, RT (E1)
Direct (E2)
Indirect, RT (E2)
Direct (E1)
Indirect, RT (E1)
Direct (E2)
Indirect, RT (E1)
Direct (E3)
Indirect, RT, early, valid (E3)
Indirect, RT, late, valid (E3)
Indirect, RT, late, invalid (E3)
Direct, Semantic (E2)
Indirect, grip force
Indirect, pallidal activation
Direct, mask A (E1)
Indirect, RT, mask A (E1)
Direct, mask B (E1)
Indirect, RT, mask B (E1)
Direct, mask B (E2)
Indirect, RT (E2)
Indirect, error rate (E2)
Direct
Indirect, RT
Direct (E1)
Indirect, RT, line (E1)
Direct, 33 ms, rect. (E2)
Indirect, RT, 33 ms, rect. (E2)
Direct, 33 ms + 50 ms, line (E2)
Indirect, RT, 33 ms + 50 ms, line (E2)
Direct, masked
Indirect, EEG, N2pc, masked
direct and indirect d'estimated
−0.2 0 0.2 0.4 0.6
direct and indirect %−correct
46% 50% 54% 58% 62%
a direct
indirect
d'difference
−0.4 −0.2 0 0.2 0.4
 ← DTA ITA →  
difference in %−correct (indirect − direct)
−8% −4% 0% 4% 8%
b
Figure 5 . Reanalysis of influential studies reporting indirect task advantages (ITAs). The
15 studies used the standard reasoning and inferred 44 ITAs. (a) Sensitivities according to our
reanalysis. To foster intuition, we also show %-correct values assuming a neutral observer. (b)
Differences between indirect minus direct sensitivities: In each group of bars, the indirect task is
compared to the corresponding direct task. Only if a confidence interval lies to the right and does not
contain 0, there is evidence for an ITA. Inspection shows that only in very few cases (8 out of 44), there
is a significant ITA, while in most cases there is no evidence for an ITA (35 out of 44), and there is
even one case with a significant opposite result, an advantage of the direct task (DTA). Not a single
study provides consistent evidence for an ITA across its experiments and conditions although the
studies claimed ITAs for all reanalyzed experiments and conditions. This pattern of results casts
serious doubts on the existence of ITAs in most, if not all, of the studies. Error bars represent
95%-confidence intervals.
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Reanalysis of Dehaene et al. (1998). The study reported two direct tasks
with sensitivities of d′ = 0.2 and d′ = 0.3, respectively. We used the results of the first
task, because it had the smaller sensitivity, thereby increasing again the chances of
confirming an ITA (Box 1). In this direct task, N = 7 participants were sampled in
M = 56 trials per condition (a total of 112 trials per participant). Taken together, our
reanalysis method estimates from these values the direct task sensitivity and its
standard error to be d′estimated,direct = 0.20 (SE = 0.11), as depicted in Figure 4b.
In the indirect task, the study reported on average a congruency effect of 24 ms
with a standard deviation of 13.5 ms in a sample of N = 12 participants sampled in
M = 256 trials per condition (totaling 512 trials). This equals a t value of
t = 24 ms/(13.5 ms/
√
12) = 6.12 from which our reanalysis method estimates the
sensitivity to be d′estimated,indirect = t · κN,M,q2 = 0.29 (SE = 0.09), where we assume
q2 = 0.0225 and, thus, κ12,256,0.0225 = 0.047, as again depicted in Figure 4b.
Inspecting Figure 4b shows that the sensitivities in both tasks are very similar,
d′difference = 0.09, SE = 0.14 (cf. Figure 4d). The confidence interval for the difference
includes zero, 95% CI = [−0.18, 0.35], thereby indicating that the difference is not
significantly different from zero. That is, there is no evidence for an ITA.
We were able to reanalyzed the results from Dehaene et al. (1998) in an additional
way. They depicted summary histograms of RTs in their Figure 2b visualizing that
congruent and incongruent RT distributions are similar in shape; with incongruent RTs
being shifted to the slower RTs as compared to congruent RTs. Nevertheless, RT
distributions largely overlap. We digitized the histogram and split RTs along the
median as described in the appropriate analysis section. From this, we estimated the
indirect task sensitivity to be d′ = 0.23 (SE = 0.03). Again, there is no difference to
their first direct task’s sensitivity (d′ = 0.2, SE = 0.11) since zero is included in the
confidence interval of the difference, 95% CI [−0.19; 0.25], see Figure 4c and 4d. Note
that this approach deviated from our appropriate analysis in that it does not compute
the median for each individual participant but uses a grand median across participants
because the published histogram pools all participants’ RT data. This approach ignores
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between-subject variance leading to a slight underestimation of the indirect task’s
sensitivity. Nevertheless, this additional reanalysis provides converging evidence
complementing our reanalysis method.
Comparing the results of our reanalysis of the original study (Figure 4b and 4c)
with the results of our replication experiment (Figure 4a) shows that the results are
surprisingly consistent. Both studies arrive at very similar estimates for the sensitivities.
This corroborates the validity of our reanalysis approach as well as of our replication
experiment (see Appendix B for further validation of our reanalysis approach).
Let us now come back to the potential caveat mentioned above: The congruency
effect we found in our replication experiment was smaller than that of the original study
(12 ms vs. 24 ms, respectively). Although it would have made our data even more
consistent with the original study to find exactly the same congruency effects, this
difference does not necessarily mean that there was a larger sensitivity in the original
study: Comparing the sensitivity of the indirect tasks in Figures 4a and 4b indicates
that the sensitivities were in fact quite comparable. This can be explained by the
trial-by-trial variability also being somewhat larger in the original study, thereby
counteracting the larger RT effect. Further research should clarify what exactly are the
differences between the original study and our replication that caused these somewhat
different congruency effects (while the other results are very consistent). One way to
achieve that would be a systematic variation of stimulus parameters, such that the
relationship of sensitivities in direct and indirect tasks can be compared across a wide
range of sensitivities. Consequently, we are currently determining the role of an ITA in
the particular setting of Dehaene et al. (1998) in a more extensive study, see Zerweck et
al. (2020).
To summarize, our reanalysis of Dehaene et al. (1998) as well as our replication of
the behavioral responses both suggest that there is no ITA in the behavioral part of
that study. This demonstrates the fundamental flaw of the standard reasoning and
suggests that similar problems might exist in other studies.
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Reanalysis of all 15 studies. We now apply our reanalysis in a similar way to
all other studies. For this, we present the data in a more compact fashion in Figure 5.
For example, what we showed in Figures 4b and 4d for the study of Dehaene et al.
(1998) now corresponds to the lines 7 and 8 in Figure 5, showing the sensitivities for
each task in Figure 5a and the difference of sensitivities in Figure 5b.
Inspecting Figure 5 shows that there is no consistent evidence for an ITA in any of
the reanalyzed studies. The 15 studies often report multiple experiments, conditions or
indirect measures, such that we investigated 44 claimed ITAs in total. Not a single
study showed ITAs across all conditions, albeit all studies claimed ITAs for all
conditions.
Our reanalysis found significant ITAs in only eight instances, which are spread
across five different studies (Finkbeiner & Palermo, 2009; Kunde et al., 2003; Naccache
et al., 2002; Sumner, 2008; Wang et al., 2017). Note that for multiple hypothesis testing,
one would expect at least some false positive results. These results are intermixed with
35 inconclusive results and even an opposite result where the direct task showed
significantly larger sensitivity than the indirect task (Naccache & Dehaene, 2001).
Let us stress that our goal was not to investigate whether there exists a “general”
ITA across all studies with their vastly different stimuli, experimental setups, tasks and
scientific questions. Therefore, we did not perform a meta-analysis or corrected for
multiple testing. This had several reasons. First, our reanalysis favored finding an ITA
by using assumptions that lead to an overestimation of the indirect task sensitivities.
We are therefore liberal in confirming ITA results in each individual study, which makes
our arguments stronger if we nevertheless do not find an ITA (Box 1). Second, there are
additional methodological issues in the reanalyzed studies that introduce further biases,
and for which we do not correct in our reanalysis (Box 2). Considering these biases
towards finding an ITA, a meta-analysis could misleadingly produce the impression that
there is a general ITA in all reanalyzed studies. An ITA might exist but perhaps only
for particular stimuli and setups. Given that the evidence for an ITA in each individual
study is now in question, the research goal should be to differentiate under which
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conditions a reliable ITA can be obtained and under which conditions this is not
possible. A meta-analysis would not serve this differentiating purpose.
In summary, reanalyzing the results from studies on unconscious priming shows
that there is little to no evidence for ITAs, despite all studies claimed ITAs for all
conditions. Sensitivity in the indirect task is not consistently better than sensitivity in
the direct task, as one would expect given that we reanalyzed only those studies,
experiments, and conditions for which inference on unconscious processing are based on
ITAs. This demonstrates how seriously the literature on unconscious priming is affected
by the flaws of the standard reasoning.
Box 2. Further methodological problems of reanalyzed studies
There are some additional methodological problems in the reanalyzed studies that can
systematically bias the results and lead to claims of an ITA even if the underlying
sensitivities in direct and indirect tasks were perfectly equal.
First, a common practice is to exclude participants with a good direct task sensitivity.
The researchers’ motivation here is to avoid including participants who are consciously
aware of the masked stimuli. However, this practice bears the problem of regression to
the mean (Barnett, Van Der Pols, & Dobson, 2004; Schmidt, 2015; Shanks, 2017), which
introduces a bias towards finding a larger indirect task sensitivity. Thus, this practice
is biased towards finding an ITA. Several studies in our reanalysis have this problem
(Finkbeiner, 2011; Mattler, 2003; Pessiglione et al., 2007; Sumner, 2008; van Gaal et
al., 2010) and it is not possible to correct for this bias. This explain why these studies
produced some of the largest differences between sensitivities in direct and indirect tasks
in our reanalysis (Figure 5).
Second, in some experimental procedures, participants have to respond to the target stim-
ulus (indirect task) and then to the masked stimulus (direct task) within the same trial
(see Finkbeiner & Palermo, 2009; Peremen & Lamy, 2014). Because the cognitive impact
of a masked stimulus decays quickly after 300 ms (Mattler, 2005), this procedure makes
the direct task more difficult because participants have to memorize the masked stimuli
while they respond to the target stimuli until they can give the direct task response.
Thus, the direct task sensitivity may be decreased, which can produce misleading ITA
results. It is somewhat impressive that, even under these favorable circumstances, none
of these reanalyzed studies provide consistent evidence for an ITA.
General discussion
Many studies in many realms of consciousness research investigating a wide range
of cognitive functions are based on the flawed standard reasoning. The main fallacy
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occurs when the standard reasoning infers an ITA. That is, a larger sensitivity for
masked stimuli in the indirect task as compared to the direct task. In an earlier
reanalysis of ten Brinke et al. (2014) by Franz and von Luxburg (2015), in our
replication of the behavioral part of Dehaene et al. (1998), and in our reanalysis of 15
highly influential studies, we found that there is no study that can consistently claim
evidence for an ITA. In contrast to many claims, responses in the indirect task often
seem to show similar sensitivity as in the direct task. In all these cases, it seems
sensible to conclude: To the degree to which indirect measures are affected by a masked
stimulus, participants can also report the masked stimulus’s identity.
These results question the validity of many claims on unconscious processing.
Because an ITA is a prerequisite for all further-reaching interpretations of the standard
reasoning about conscious vs. unconscious processing, our critique affects all these
inferences. In particular, the interpretation that masked stimuli were processed to a
greater extend than what participants can consciously report and that, thus, processing
must have been unconscious is cast in doubt because sensitivity in the indirect task did
not prove to be greater than sensitivity in the direct task. Therefore, the fallacy of the
standard reasoning has serious consequences for the trustworthiness of the scientific
literature on consciousness.
Nevertheless, our results do not necessarily rule out the possibility that ITAs exist
in some cases depending on the particular setup and research question posed. For
example, the setting of Schmidt (2002) using color stimuli seems to produce reliable
ITA results because the appropriate analysis was used to compare d′ values between the
two tasks. Another example applying the appropriate analysis is the study of
Kunst-Wilson and Zajonc (1980) in which participants were likely to find a previously
seen geometric shape attractive but were unable to determine which shapes they have
seen before. Therefore, using the indirect attractiveness task produced a higher
%-correct when identifying which shapes were previously presented compared to the
direct recognition task—an ITA demonstrated by testing for a difference in %-correct.
Therefore, we do not claim that there were never ITAs and that there were never
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instances of better sensitivity in the indirect task than in the direct task (and
consequently maybe superior and independent unconscious processing). Such a claim
would be far beyond the scope of a single scientific study. But we do claim that one of
the most prevalent methods in the wide research area of unconscious priming is
fundamentally flawed and that this flaw affects and potentially invalidates many studies.
What we suggest is a research program: Given the tremendous interest in
unconscious priming and the far-reaching inferences based on studies using the standard
reasoning, researchers should reinvestigate the most relevant cases of ITAs and clarify to
which degree the claims in those studies are truly warranted.
In short, the literature needs a serious and concerted reassessment that would go
well beyond the scope of a single study and will also require—in critical cases—the
collection of new data. In many cases where superior unconscious processing already
seemed an established fact, we expect that this finding needs to be revised. In other
cases, researchers might still be able to establish such a relationship—which will then be
even more interesting and foster the theoretical understanding of when exactly
conscious processing is vital for a cognitive function and when it is not.
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Appendix B
Validation of reanalysis method
We demonstrate in two studies that the appropriate analysis based on the full
trial-by-trial data is well approximated by our reanalysis based only on the typically
reported statistics (e.g., a t value for the congruency effect in the indirect task). We
applied the appropriate analyses using the full, trial-by-trial data and our reanalysis
using only the reported summary statistics to the original data from ten Brinke et al.
(2014, see Figure B1) and to our replication based on the study of Dehaene et al. (1998,
see Figure B2). Results from the two analyses are very comparable indicating that our
reanalysis closely matched the appropriate analysis. In the rest of this section, we
present additional evidence for the validity of our reanalysis by using simulated data.
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Figure B1 . Appropriate analysis in (a) and reanalysis (b) applied to ten Brinke et al.
(2014). Our reanalysis using only the typically reported statistics produced approximately the same
results as the appropriate analysis applied to the original, full trial-by-trial data. In both cases, there is
no evidence for an indirect task advantage.
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Figure B2 . Appropriate analysis in (a) and reanalysis (b) applied to our replication
study. Our reanalysis using only the typically reported statistics produced approximately the same
results as the appropriate analysis applied to our study’s, full trial-by-trial data. In both cases, there is
no evidence for an indirect task advantage. Note that the indirect task sensitivity in our reanalysis is
smaller than in the trial-by-trial analysis. This is not a contradiction to our claim that in expectation
the indirect task sensitivity is overestimated by our reanalysis. Particular estimates can vary to some
degree and, as in this case, be sometimes lower than when the full trial-by-trial data is used.
Simulations
We conducted multiple simulations to validate that our reanalysis method
appropriately controls for statistical errors (type I and type II). Each simulation was
repeated 10, 000 times. In each run, we generated a trial-by-trial data set with a direct
and an indirect task according to the standard repeated measures model outlined in
Appendix D. We simulated N participants with sensitivities, d′true,i, independently and
randomly drawn from normal distributions with expected value d′true and standard
deviation q (see Appendix E for why q is the standard deviation of individual true
sensitivities). Note that we sampled d′true,i for each participant independently in the
direct and indirect task. Applying Signal Detection Theory, each of these individual
sensitivities implies two normal distributions separated by d′true,i standard deviations.
From these normal distributions, we sampled M responses per condition for a total for
2M trials for each participant. We did this twice, once for each task. In the direct task,
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we compared each response to the true median: If the response lied on the same side as
the normal distribution it was sampled from, the simulated binary decision by the
participant in this trial was correct, otherwise it was wrong. In the indirect task, we
simply treated the drawn responses as the indirect measures (e.g., RTs). We then
applied the traditional analysis, the appropriate analysis and our reanalysis. We
obtained similar results with log-normal distributions and only report normal
distribution results for brevity.
In each simulation, we varied N , M , d′true and q. If not declared otherwise, the
same q was used for data simulation and reanalysis. Only in simulations 5 and 6, we
varied the true q with which the data was simulated and used a different q for our
reanalysis in order to see how getting this parameter wrong would affect our results.
Simulations 1-3 demonstrate that the standard reasoning miserably fails when
applied to the study of Dehaene et al. (1998). Simulation 4 shows that our replication
has sufficient statistical power to find an ITA if it was there. Simulations 5 and 6 show
how our reanalysis would be affected, if the true q was different than what we assumed.
We then summarize additional 108 simulations showing that our estimators, even
though they use simplifying approximations, are approximately unbiased.
Simulation 1: Controlling type I errors. We used the same number of
participants in the direct (N = 7) vs. indirect (N = 12) task as well as the same number
of trials per condition (direct M = 56 vs. indirect M = 256) as the original study of
Dehaene et al. (1998). Assuming no ITA, we set sensitivities in both tasks to be equal
(direct d′true = 0.25 vs. indirect d′true = 0.25). We assumed q = 0.15 for this simulation.
Even though the same sensitivity underlies both tasks, the direct task fails to
reach significance half of the time (51.2%) while the indirect task is almost always
significant (99.5%). This is not surprising and shows how seriously underpowered the
direct task was due to fewer samples, N and M . When applying the standard
reasoning, a scientist would erroneously conclude an ITA from a non-significant direct
task result and a significant indirect task effect in 48.6% of experiments. In other
words: The widely used standard reasoning would infer an ITA half of the time even
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though there is no ITA present!
Since there is no ITA present, our reanalysis should find an ITA only as often as
prespecified by the significance level α = 5%. Indeed, we find a difference between the
two tasks only in 4.7% of the runs. This demonstrates that our reanalysis approach
controls appropriately for type I errors.
Simulation 2: Controlling for type II errors with an underpowered
direct task. We use the same assumptions as in Simulation 1 except that we now
assume there exists an ITA (direct d′true = 0 vs. indirect d′true = 0.25). Since there is an
ITA present, a high statistical power is desired to detect it and avoid type II errors.
Typically, a power above 1− β = 80% is desired. However, our reanalysis found the ITA
in only 46.2% of the runs. Using the full trial-by-trial data to test for a difference
(instead of only using the reported t value from the indirect task) also produced a test
power of only 45.9%. There is simply not enough data in the direct task to provide
sufficient evidence for an ITA. The problem with lacking statistical power is not located
in our reanalysis because also the appropriate analysis has a low statistical power.
Instead, the problem is the low sample size in the direct task.
Simulation 3: Controlling for type II errors with sufficient samples in
the direct task. We repeated Simulation 2 but increased the number of participants
and trials in the direct task to match the ones of the indirect task (N = 12 and
M = 256). This is most sensible when testing for a difference because a balanced design
maximizes statistical power. Here, our reanalysis method detects the ITA in 78.3% of
the runs, which is close to the desired 80%. Using the full trial-by-trial data provides a
power of 84.2%. This demonstrates that our reanalysis method provides sufficient power
given sufficient samples.
Simulation 4: Statistical power in our replication. We repeated
Simulation 3 but used the same number of participants and samples as in our
replication study, N = 24 and M = 128 in both tasks. There, we have the same amount
of observations as Dehaene et al. (1998) (double the participants, half the trials). Here,
our reanalysis detects the ITA in 96.5% of the runs. The appropriate analysis using full
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trial-by-trial data instead of only a t value in the indirect task achieves 97.0%. The
increase in statistical power compared to Simulation 3 comes from sampling more
participants which is more efficient than sampling more trials given a fixed total number
of observations (Rouder & Haaf, 2018).
Simulation 5: Overestimating parameter q. We repeated Simulation 3, the
balanced Dehaene et al. (1998) setting with an ITA, but generated the data with
q = 0.1. We still use q = 0.15 for the reanalysis, thus, we overestimate the true q. Our
reanalysis now successfully detects the ITA in 99.6% of the runs and so does the
appropriate analysis with 99.2%. We detect more ITAs here than in Simulation 3
because individual sensitivities vary less (lower q) so that observed values are more
precise. This benefits the appropriate analysis and our reanalysis alike.
Simulation 6: Underestimating parameter q. Repeating Simulation 5, we
now simulated the data with q = 0.3 and kept the parameter of our reanalysis at
q = 0.15, that is, we now underestimate the true q. Individual sensitivities vary a lot
now. Even though the mean true direct task sensitivity is d′true = 0 (50%-correct), due
to a large standard deviation of q = 0.3, 95% of participants’ true sensitivities range
between -0.6 (38%-correct) and 0.6 (62%-correct). The assumption q = 0.3 poses a
problem from a theoretical perspective because some participants can discriminate the
masked stimuli relatively well (above 60%-correct). But, from a technical perspective, it
also decreases the statistical power. With such a large variability between participants,
our reanalysis detects an ITA in only 62.2% of the runs. The appropriate analysis
achieves a similarly low power with 69.2%.
Additional Simulations. We conducted additional simulations, one for each
combination of the following parameters: N ∈ {5, 10, 20}, M ∈ {50, 100, 200},
d′true = {0, 0.1, 0.2, 0.5}, and q ∈ {0.1, 0.15, 0.3}. In all these simulations, the average,
absolute deviation between true sensitivities, d′true, and our estimates, d′estimated
was ≤ 0.01. A deviation of 0.01 in terms of sensitivity translates into a deviation as
small as 0.2%-correct, which can be considered negligible in this setting—and deviations
in simulations with N ≥ 10 are substantially less.
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We computed the standard deviation of d′estimated across the 10,000 simulations of
each parameter combination. We compared this with the estimated standard error, SE.
For this purpose, we squared SE of each run, averaged the values and took the square
root of the average. For the direct task, the difference between actual variability and
our estimates was again ≤ 0.01. For the indirect task, the same was true when N ≥ 10.
However, for very small sample sizes (N = 5) our reanalysis deviated to some degree
but the absolute difference between actual standard deviation and our estimates still
was ≤ 0.05. Since all reanalyzed studies use sample sizes of N ≥ 10 in the indirect task,
our reanalysis produced approximately unbiased estimates. Overall, our reanalysis
approximates the appropriate analysis sufficiently well in the context we applied it to.
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Appendix C
Optimality of median classifier
In the appropriate analysis to infer an ITA, one needs to transform continuous
measurements of the indirect task (e.g., RTs) into a binary classification response. In
this step it is important to use the best possible classifier, in order to achieve the
highest d′ or %-correct values and thereby increase the chance to establish an ITA.
Depending on the type of measurement that is taken in the indirect task (e.g., RT,
brain activity, grip force, etc.), this best classifier can have different forms. In many
cases, the median classifier is a suitable choice. For example with RT data (as in our
replication based on Dehaene et al., 1998), the classifier computes for each participant
the median RT across all trials and classifies a trial as congruent if the RT is faster than
the median and as incongruent if the RT is slower. Below, we prove that the median
classifier is optimal in this setting. The proof requires two assumptions:
(1) The indirect measure follows a normal or log-normal distribution with an additive
shift between congruent and incongruent conditions. In our case, this assumption
is justified because it is well known that RT distributions are well approximated
by log-normal distributions (Ulrich & Miller, 1993; Palmer, Horowitz, Torralba, &
Wolfe, 2011).
(2) An equal number of observations need to be drawn in both conditions, which is
satisfied by the typical experimental design.
Note, that Franz and von Luxburg (2015) also applied nonparametric machine
learning classifiers but—as expected—these approaches could not outperform the
median classifier in this scenario.
Classification and statistical optimality in more detail
In this section, we describe how an optimal classification of the single-trial data in
an indirect task can be performed. We prove below that, under the assumption that the
RTs follow a normal distribution or a log-normal distribution (Ulrich & Miller, 1993),
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the statistically optimal classifier is given by a median split of the reaction times
(“median classifier”).
General form of the optimal classifier. Consider a classification task
where the input is a real-valued number x (e.g., a reaction time, RT), and the classifier
is supposed to predict one of two labels y (e.g., ’congruent’ or ’incongruent’; for
simplicity we use labels 1 and 2 in the following). Following the standard setup in
statistical decision theory (Bishop, 2006, section 1.5) we assume that the input data X
and the output data Y are drawn according to some fixed (but unknown) probability
distribution P . This distribution can be described uniquely by the class-conditional
distributions P (X |Y = 1) and P (X |Y = 2) and the class priors pi1 = P (Y = 1) and
pi2 = P (Y = 2). A classifier is a function f : IR→ {1, 2} that assigns a label y to each
input x. The classifier that has the smallest probability of error is called the Bayes
classifier. In case the classes have equal weight, that is pi1 = pi2, the Bayes classifier has
a particularly simple form: It classifies an input point x by the class that has the higher
class-conditional density at this point. Formally, this classifier is given by
fopt(x) :=

1 if P (X = x |Y = 1) > P (X = x |Y = 2)
2 otherwise.
(1)
Optimal classifier for normal and log-normal distributions. We now
consider the special case where the class-conditionals follow a particular distribution.
Let us start with the normally distributed case. We assume that both class-conditionals
are normal distributions with means µ1, µ2 and equal variance σ2, and we denote their
corresponding probability density functions (PDFs) by ϕµ1,σ and ϕµ2,σ. Under the
additional assumption that both classes have equal weights pi1 = pi2 = 0.5, the
cumulative distribution function (CDF) of the input (marginal distribution of X) is
given as
Ω(x) := 0.5 ·
(
Φ(x− µ1
σ
) + Φ(x− µ2
σ
)
)
, (2)
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where Φ denotes the CDF of the standard normal distribution. For t ∈ IR, we introduce
the step function classifier with threshold t by
ft(x) :=

1 if x ≤ t
2 otherwise.
(3)
In the special case where the threshold t coincides with the median of the marginal
distribution of X, we call the resulting step function classifier the median classifier.
Proposition (Median classifier is optimal for normal model) If the input
distribution is given by Equation (2), then the optimal classifier fopt coincides with the
median classifier.
Proof. Because both classes have the same weight of 0.5, the Bayes classifier is given by
fopt as in Equation (1). For any choice of µ1, µ2 and σ, the class-conditional PDFs ϕµ1,σ
and ϕµ2,σ intersect exactly once, namely at t∗ = (µ1 + µ2)/2. By definition of fopt, the
optimal classifier fopt is then the step function classifier with threshold t∗. We now
compute the value of the CDF at t∗:
Ω(t∗) = 0.5 ·
(
Φ(t
∗ − µ1
σ
) + Φ(t
∗ − µ2
σ
)
)
= 0.5 ·
(
Φ(µ2 − µ12σ ) + Φ(
µ1 − µ2
2σ )
)
= 0.5 ·
(
Φ(µ2 − µ12 ) + (1− Φ(
µ2 − µ1
2 )
)
= 0.5.
Here, the second last equality comes from the fact that the normal distribution is
symmetric about 0. This calculation shows that the optimal threshold t∗ indeed
coincides with the median of the input distribution, which is what we wanted to
prove. 
It is easy to see that this proof can be generalized to more general types of
symmetric probability distributions. It is, however, even possible to prove an analogous
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statement for log-normal distributions, which are not symmetric themselves. We
introduce the notation λµ,σ for the PDF of a log-normal distribution, and Λµ,σ for the
corresponding CDF. These functions are defined as
λµ,σ(x) :=
1
xσ
√
2pi
exp
(
− (log x− µ)
2
2σ2
)
and Λµ,σ(x) := Φ
( log x− µ
σ
)
.
Consider the case where the class-conditional distributions are log-normal
distributions with same scale parameter σ but different location parameters µ1 and µ2,
and assume that both classes have the same weights pi1 = pi2 = 0.5. Then the PDF and
CDF of the input distribution (marginal distribution of X) are given as
g(x) = 0.5 · ( λµ1,σ(x) + λµ2,σ(x) )
G(x) = 0.5 · ( Λµ1,σ(x) + Λµ2,σ(x) ). (4)
Proposition (Median classifier is optimal for log-normal model) If the input
distribution is given by Equation (4), then the optimal classifier fopt coincides with the
median classifier.
Proof. The proof is analogous to the previous one. For any choice of µ1, µ2 and σ, the
densities λµ1,σ and λµ2,σ intersect exactly once. To see this, we solve the equation
λµ1,σ(t∗) = λµ2,σ(t∗), which leads to the unique solution t∗ = exp((µ1 + µ2)/2). The
input CDF at this value can be computed as
G(t∗) = 0.5
(
Λµ1,σ(t∗) + Λµ2,σ(t∗)
)
= 0.5
(
Φ(µ2 − µ12σ ) + Φ(
µ1 − µ2
2σ )
)
= 0.5.
The last step follows as above by the symmetry of the normal cdf. 
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Appendix D
Estimating sensitivities from typically reported results
We use typically reported results from studies on unconscious priming to estimate the
direct and indirect task sensitivities, d′estimated,direct and d′estimated,indirect. First, we recap
the basic model assumptions of a standard repeated measures ANOVA and introduce
notation. We then derive estimators for the sensitivity and standard error in both tasks
using only the typically reported results. Finally, we compute the difference between
direct vs. indirect task sensitivities and construct a confidence interval around that
difference in order to test for an ITA.
Model assumptions
Our reanalysis of both tasks is based on the standard model of repeated measures
ANOVA and paired t test (Winer, Brown, & Michels, 1991; Maxwell & Delaney, 2000;
Rouder & Haaf, 2018) as employed in all reanalyzed studies. In this model N
participants perform M trials in each condition. In the specific setting we consider,
there are only 2 conditions. In the direct task, this corresponds to trials where the
masked stimulus is from either of two categories, A vs. B. In the indirect task, the two
conditions are typically congruent (A-A, B-B) vs. incongruent (A-B, B-A). In each
trial, Yijk denotes the response from participant i (1, ..., N) in condition j (1 or 2) in
trial k (1, ...,M). In the direct task, responses Yijk represent participants’ internal
evidence of the masked stimuli (some neural activity indicating whether the participant
saw a masked stimulus from category A or from B). Based on this noisy internal
evidence, participants make an internal classification and guess in each trial to which
category the stimulus belonged. In the indirect task, responses Yijk are the indirect
measures (e.g., RTs).
The standard model decomposes participants’ responses Yijk into five components:
Yijk = µ+ pi + cj + (p× c)ij + ijk.
To facilitate understanding, we now describe the model for the example of
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congruency effects on RTs in the indirect task; but the same notation applies to other
indirect measures and to the direct task as well. RTs have a grand mean µ. Some
participants have faster RTs than others which is captured in participants’ effects pi.
The congruency condition has an effect cj on RTs. While c1 is negative leading to faster
RTs in congruent trials, c2 is positive reflecting slower RTs in the incongruent
conditions. Participants differ in the extent to which the congruency conditions affect
them captured in (p× c)ij so that some participants have a larger congruency effect
than others. The variability in the individual effects is captured by this term’s variance,
Var[(p× c)ij] = σ2p×c. Additionally, there is trial-by-trial noise ijk from neuromuscular
noise and measurement error leading to different responses in each trial. This
trial-by-trial measurement error is assumed by the standard models to have a constant
variance (homogeneity) over participants and conditions, Var[ijk] = σ2 . The
congruency effect cj is a fixed effect while participant and interaction effects (pi and
(p× c)ij) are random effects because they depend on the drawn sample of participants.
Random effects and trial-by-trial noise are assumed to be normally distributed with an
expected value of zero and their corresponding variance.
Raw effects and sensitivities. Each participant i has an individual expected
congruency effect, ∆i, which theoretically would be obtained by sampling infinite trials.
The expected RT difference across participants is denoted by ∆.
∆i = (c2 + (p× c)i2)− (c1 + (p× c)i1)
∆ = c2 − c1
In a typical experiment, the individual congruency effects are estimated by the observed
mean difference between conditions. For the i-th participant, this estimate is ∆ˆi and
averaged across participants this is ∆ˆ.
∆ˆi = Y¯i2· − Y¯i1· = 1
M
M∑
k=1
Yi2k − 1
M
M∑
k=1
Yi1k
∆ˆ = 1
N
N∑
i=1
∆ˆi
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A participant’s true sensitivity d′true,i is the normalized effect—normalized by the
trial-by-trial error standard deviation σ. This quantity indicates, similar to a signal to
noise ratio, how well a participant’s RTs are separable and therefore to which degree the
masked stimuli were processed, cf. Figure 3a. The expectation across participants is the
true sensitivity d′true indicating how well the RTs of a prototypical participant are
separated.
d′true,i =
∆i
σ
d′true =
∆
σ
.
In the direct task, d′true is typically measured by the sensitivity index d′ averaged
across participants. Participants’ individual d′i are calculated from hit rate, HR
(%-correct guesses for masked stimuli from category A), and false alarm rate, FA
(%-incorrect guesses for masked stimuli from category B), where Φ−1 is the inverse
cumulative density function of the normal distribution.
d′i = Φ−1(HR)− Φ−1(FA)
d′ = 1
N
∑
i
d′i.
Note that the empirical literature often uses the notation d′ without a clear distinction
between estimated vs. true value and individual vs. average effects. Because we need to
be more precise in our derivations: We denote the true value of an individual
participant by d′true,i and the sensitivity index, which is an estimate for the true value,
by d′i. We denote the true sensitivity across participants by d′true. In the direct task, this
is estimated by the average across d′i values denoted by d′. We will also label this
averaged estimate d′estimated,indirect. Since the indirect task does not offer such an
estimate, we use the reported results to come up with an estimate for the true
sensitivity, which we will call d′estimated,indirect.
Two variance sources: true effect (between-) vs. trial-by-trial error
(within-subject) variance. Participants differ in their true congruency effect. The
WHEN CAN SCIENTISTS CLAIM AN ITA? 54
variance of these true inter-individual differences can be derived from the model
variances using the standard assumptions (1) (p× c)ij ∼ N (0, σ2p×c), (2)
V ar[c1] = V ar[c2] = 0, and (3) (p× c)i1 = −(p× c)i2. We denote this true effect
variance as σ2effect:
σ2effect = Var[∆i] = Var[[c2 + (p× c)i2]− [c1 + (p× c)i1]]
= Var[(p× c)i2 − (p× c)i1] = Var[2(p× c)i2]
= 4σ2p×c.
The variance of the actually observed congruency effects is conceptually different
from the variance of the true effects. We denote the variance of the observed congruency
effects as σ2∆ˆi . The observed congruency effects vary more because they are not only
affected by true inter-individual difference but also by trial-by-trial measurement errors:
σ2∆ˆi = Var[∆ˆi]
= Var
[
Y¯i2· − Y¯i1·
]
= Var
[
1
M
(
M∑
k=1
µ+ pi + c2 + (p× c)i2 + i2k
)
− 1
M
(
M∑
k=1
µ+ pi + c1 + (p× c)i1 + i1k
)]
= Var
[
[c2 + (p× c)i2]− [c1 + (p× c)i1] + 1
M
(
M∑
k=1
i2k
)
− 1
M
(
M∑
k=1
i1k
)]
= Var
[
∆i +
1
M
(
M∑
k=1
i2k
)
− 1
M
(
M∑
k=1
i1k
)]
= Var[∆i] + Var
[
1
M
M∑
k=1
i2k
]
+ Var
[
1
M
M∑
k=1
i1k
]
= σ2effect +
2
M
σ2 .
This has an implication for the variance of average congruency effects, ∆ˆ = 1
N
∑
i ∆ˆi.
These observed, average congruency effects vary due to two variance sources, the true
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inter-individual differences and trial-by-trial measurement error.
∆ˆ ∼ N
(
∆,
σ2effect + 2M σ
2

N
)
.
We will later have to estimate σ2 from a given σ2∆ˆi . To achieve this, we must
disentangle σ2effect and σ2 . We do so by defining the ratio q2 between these two sources
of variance:
q2 = σ
2
effect
σ2
.
This parameter tells us how much of the observed variability comes from true
differences vs. noise. If q2 = 0 then all participants would have the same true
congruency effect and observed differences are only due to trial-by-trial error. If q2 is
large then there is relatively small trial-by-trial error variance and observed differences
between participants stem from reliable, true differences between subjects. Crucially,
note that q2 is also the variance of true, individual sensitivities.
V ar[d′true,i] = V ar
[
∆i
σ
]
= σ
2
effect
σ2
= q2.
Thus, the square root of this ratio, q, is the standard deviation of true, individual
sensitivities.
q = SD[d′true,i]
We derive a reasonable value to use for our setting in Appendix E, which is q2 = 0.0225.
This means that we will assume that participants’ sensitivities d′true,i vary around some
true value d′true with a standard deviation of q = 0.15.
Relation between sensitivity and accuracy. As we have already mentioned,
some published studies report d′ values, whereas other studies report %-correct values
in the direct task. Because we would like to be able to work with either of them, we
now discuss the relationship that can transform %-correct values into d′ values and vice
versa.
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Recall that d′true,i denotes the true sensitivity of participant i, and let us introduce
the notation pii for the true probability of a correct classification of a masked stimuli by
participant i. We now make the assumption of a neutral criterion in the direct task,
that is, participants are not inclined to guess one category of the masked stimuli (A or
B) more often than the other. Under this assumption, the true relationship is
d′true,i = 2Φ−1(pii) where Φ−1 is the inverse cumulative normal distribution (Macmillan
& Creelman, 2004). To simplify our later analysis, we now introduce the linear
approximation h(x) = 5(x− 0.5) ≈ 2Φ−1(x). This approximation works remarkably well
in the regime of sensitivities being close to zero:
given pii, we approximate d′true,i ≈ h(pii) = 5(pii − 0.5)
given d′true,i, we approximate pii ≈ h−1(d′true,i) =
1
5d
′
true,i + 0.5
For example, an accuracy of 54%-correct is approximately translated into the sensitivity
d′true,i ≈ 5 · (0.54− 0.5) = 0.2. This is very close to the true translation,
d′true,i = 2Φ−1(pii) = 0.201. Table D1 shows that this approximation provides an almost
perfect fit in the range of pii ∈ [0.4; 0.6] or, equivalently, d′true,i ∈ [−0.5; 0.5]. Larger
values, that is, an accuracy above 60%-correct, would be at odds with the experimental
setting in which direct task performance is assumed to be close to chance (d′true,i close to
0 and pii close to 0.5).
Estimated sensitivity, d′estimated,direct, from mean sensitivity index d′
We want to estimate the sensitivity and corresponding standard error from the
typically reported direct task results. Usually, the average over individual sensitivity
indices is reported as d′. This sensitivity index is already a measure for the true
sensitivity and we take it as it is (Macmillan & Creelman, 2004),
d′estimated,direct = d′. (5)
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Table D1
Relation between the true accuracy (first column), the approximation of the sensitivity
(second column) and the true sensitivity (third column). Note that for pii in the range of
[0.5, 0.6] and Di in the range of [0, 0.5] (first six rows in the table) there is an almost
perfect fit between h(pii) and d′true,i. Negative values of d′true,i follow symmetrically.
pii h(pii) d′true,i
0.50 0.000 0.000
0.52 0.100 0.100
0.54 0.200 0.201
0.56 0.300 0.302
0.58 0.400 0.404
0.60 0.500 0.507
0.62 0.600 0.611
0.64 0.700 0.717
0.66 0.800 0.825
0.68 0.900 0.935
0.70 1.000 1.049
The standard error of d′ is composed of two variances, one due to systematic variation
between individuals’ true sensitivities (d′true,i) and the other due to non-systematic
measurement error (d′i). We use two simplifications: (a) We neglect dependencies
between them because the variance of random error Var[d′i ] does not change
substantially for different sensitivity values in the relevant range, Ddiri ∈ [−0.5, 0.5];
(b) We apply the approximation function h that relates d′i to pˆii. This allows us to use
the variance of the binomially distributed accuracies pˆii from 2M trials,
Var[pˆii ] = pii(1− pii)/(2M), and relate them back to the variance of d′i, which leads to
Var[d′i ] ≈ 52 Var[pˆii ].
SEdirect =
√
Var [d′]
=
√√√√Var [ 1
N
∑
i
d′i
]
= 1√
N
√
Var[d′i] =
1√
N
√
Var[d′true,i + d′i ]
(a)≈ 1√
N
√
Var[d′true,i] + Var[d′i ]
(b)≈ 1√
N
√
Var[d′true,i] + 52 Var[pˆii ]
= 1√
N︸ ︷︷ ︸
average
√√√√√√√ q2︸︷︷︸
between subject variation
+ 52
(
1
5d
′ + 0.5
) (
1−
(
1
5d
′ + 0.5
))
2M︸ ︷︷ ︸
non-systematic error of pˆii
. (6)
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Without simplifications (a) and (b), one could construct an exact estimator. Exact
calculations from Miller (1996) show that d′ slightly overestimates the true sensitivity
d′true but that this bias is so small that the estimator can considered approximately
unbiased when sample sizes as in our context are used. On the other hand, our
simplifications allow us to find a closed form solution that is simple to compute. Our
estimators are well aligned with the true values, which we have shown by validating
simulations in Appendix B.
Estimated sensitivity, d′estimated,direct, from mean accuracy pˆi
Instead of d′, some studies report the average classification accuracy pˆi (%-correct)
for the direct task. We estimate the sensitivity d′estimated,direct from the mean accuracy pˆi
by a plug-in estimator (Macmillan & Creelman, 2004),
d′estimated,direct = 2Φ−1(pˆi) ≈ 5 · (pˆi − 0.5) (7)
where Φ−1 is the inverse cumulative normal distribution. Exploiting the linearity of
approximation h in (*), we can derive that this estimator is approximately unbiased:
E[d′estimated,direct] = E[2Φ−1(pˆi)] ≈ E[h(pˆi)]
(∗)= h[E(pˆi)] = h(pi) ≈ 2Φ−1(pi) = d′true.
Next, the standard error can be derived in the same fashion as for reported d′ values so
that we obtain:
SEdirect =
1√
N
√
q2 + 5 pˆi (1− pˆi)2M . (8)
Estimated sensitivity, d′estimated,indirect, from t and F values
Now let us move to estimating sensitivities from t values in the indirect task. We
will show that an unbiased estimator is obtained from multiplying the t value by the
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constant κN,M,q2 :
d′estimated,indirect = t · κN,M,q2 with κN,M,q2 =
Γ
(
N−1
2
)
√
N−1
2 Γ
(
N−2
2
)
√
Mq2 + 2
NM
, (9)
Where Γ is the gamma distribution.
Under our model assumptions, the t value is computed from the observed
congruency effect divided by the estimated standard error:
t = ∆ˆ
σˆ∆ˆi
√
N
We know that ∆ˆ ∼ N
(
∆, (σ2effect + 2M σ
2
 )/N
)
from above. Now we introduce
independent random variables Z ∼ N (0, 1) and V ∼ χ2 (N − 1) and rewrite the t value
as follows:
t =
Z
√(
σ2effect + 2M σ2
)
/N + ∆√(
σ2effect + 2M σ2
)√
V
N−1
√
N
=
Z + ∆
√√√√ N(
σ2effect + 2M σ2
)
 √N − 1√
V
We now use σ2effect = q2σ2 (also from the preliminaries) to isolate σ2 and obtain d′true.
t =
Z + ∆
√√√√ N(
q2σ2 + 2M σ2
)
 √N − 1√
V
=
Z + ∆
σ
√√√√( NM
Mq2 + 2
) √N − 1√
V
=
Z + d′true
√√√√( NM
Mq2 + 2
) √N − 1√
V
As a result, t follows a t distribution with degrees of freedom df = N − 1 and
non-centrality parameter δ = d′true
√
NM
Mq2+2 . We know the expected t value to be
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E[t] = κ−1N,M,q2 · d′true (Hedges, 1981). In consequence, an unbiased estimator of d′true is
d′estimated,indirect = t · κN,M,q2 .
As for the expected value, the variance of t values is also given by the properties
of a non-central t distribution. Multiplying this variance by the constant κN,M,q2 yields
the variance of our estimated sensitivity d′estimated,indirect. Since this depends on the
non-centrality parameter, we use the plugin estimator δˆ = d′estimated,indirect
√
NM
Mq2+2 . The
standard error being its positive square root follows accordingly:
SEdirect =
√
Var[κN,M,q2 · t] = κN,M,q2
√
Var[t]
= κN,M,q2
√√√√√√1 + δˆ2
N − 3 −
δˆ2(N − 1)Γ
(
N−2
2
)2
2Γ
(
N−1
2
)2
= κN,M,q2
√√√√√√1 + (d′estimated,indirect)2 NMMq2+2
N − 3 −
(d′estimated,indirect)2 NMMq2+2(N − 1)Γ
(
N−2
2
)2
2Γ
(
N−1
2
)2
= κN,M,q2
√√√√√
1 + 2t2
N − 1
(
Γ(N−12 )
Γ(N−22 )
)2(N − 1
N − 3
)
− t2 (10)
With this, we can estimate the sensitivity and its standard error from a give t value in a
repeated measures design.
Finally, note that this approach can be applied identically to reported F values
instead of t values. The reason is that in repeated measures ANOVA settings with two
conditions the equality |t| = √F holds. The main argument can be derived in the
following equations using the standard definitions for the explained (SSE) and residual
summed squares (SSR), see Winer et al. (1991); Maxwell and Delaney (2000):
t2 =
 ∆ˆ
σˆ∆ˆi
·
√
N
2 = 4 ·N · (∆ˆ/2)2
1
N−1
∑N
i=1
(
∆ˆi − ∆ˆ
)2 = 2 ·N · (∆ˆ/2)21
N−1
∑N
i=1
(
∆ˆi−∆ˆ
2
)2
= 2 ·N · (∆ˆ/2)
2
2∑Ni=1 ( ∆ˆi−∆ˆ2 )2 /(2N − 2) =
SSE/dfE
SSR/dfR
= F.
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Confidence intervals for the difference in sensitivities
Based on the previous estimators, we now need to test for a significant difference
between sensitivities in direct vs. indirect tasks. For this purpose we construct a 95%
confidence interval around the difference d′difference while taking the standard error
SEdifference of the estimated difference into account:
d′difference = d′estimated,indirect − d′estimated,direct (11)
SEdifference =
√
(SEdirect)2 + (SEindirect)2 (12)
95% CI = [d′difference ± z0.975 · SEdifference] , (13)
where z0.975 = 1.96 is the 97.5% quantile of the normal distribution. If zero is
included in the confidence interval, 0 ∈ 95% CI, then there is not sufficient evidence for
an ITA because the observed difference can be explained by measurement error in a
situation where the true direct and indirect task sensitivities are equal. Only if the
confidence interval lies above zero, that is 95% CI = [a, b] and a > 0, there is evidence
for the presence of an ITA.
Note that in this test we use quantiles zα of the normal distribution and not
quantiles of the t distribution. Using the t distribution would require to estimate the
degrees of freedom, which is unnecessarily complicated for our approach. We use the
quantiles of the normal distribution which leads to a more liberal test, that is, our
approach confirms an ITA more often than if we were using t quantiles. We are
therefore more conservative in our critique and our argument is stronger when we do
not confirm an ITA.
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Appendix E
Estimating the ratio q2 of between- vs. within-subject variance
As we have seen in the reanalysis of direct and indirect task sensitivities, we need to
know one particular parameter: q2, a ratio of two variances. This is not an artifact of
our analysis but unavoidable. To see why, consider estimating the indirect task
sensitivity d′estimated,indirect from t values. A t value is computed, roughly speaking, by
dividing an observed effect by its standard error, t = x¯/SE. For example, x¯ is the
average congruency effect and SE is the estimated standard error of congruency effects
across participants. This standard error is influenced by two sources of variability:
variance due to true, inter-individual difference in congruency effects across participants
(σ2effect) and variance due to trial-by-trial measurement error (σ2 ). We want to isolate σ2
in order to estimate the sensitivity d′true = ∆/σ. We do so by defining the ratio of the
two sources of variability:
q2 = σ
2
effect
σ2
.
We know that this parameter is also equal to the variance of individual true
sensitivities. Therefore, it might be more intuitive to think of this value un-squared: q
is the standard deviation of participants’ true sensitivities, q = SD[d′true,i].
We considered multiple studies making explicit assumptions about the ratio of
between- vs. within-subject variance as well as our own replication study. All these
studies suggest a specific value for q2. Our results are summarized in Table E1. For our
reanalysis, we use the assumption:
q2 = 0.0225 ⇐⇒ q = 0.15.
Large values of q favors the ITA hypothesis in our reanalysis because larger values
of q attribute more variance to σ2effect, then σ2 is smaller and, in turn, d′estimated,indirect is
larger. Hence, overestimating q2 means increasing the probability of confirming an ITA.
Not discovering an ITA under those circumstances makes our argument even stronger.
Accordingly, the largest q2 value we found is 0.021. Thus, as mentioned above, we use
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Table E1
Based on different studies, we used different assumption for the parameter q2 to
conducted our reanalysis of the indirect task sensitivity from Dehaene et al. (1998) (last
column). Larger values of q2 increase the estimated, indirect task sensitivity.
Reported values Reanalysis of Dehaene et al. (1998)
Study σeffect σ q2 d′estimated
Rouder & Haaf (2018) 9.88 104 0.009 0.21
Our replication 6.70 78 0.007 0.20
Miller & Ulrich (2013) 10.78 92 0.014 0.24
Jensen (2002) 10.84 91 0.014 0.25
Ribeiro et al. (2016) 11.55 79 0.021 0.28
Our assumption 11.63 78 0.0225 0.29
q2 = 0.0225 for our reanalysis corresponding to the squared value q = 0.15. To gauge
the effect of this parameter, we also conducted our reanalysis with different values of q2.
Specifically, we used a more realistic assumption (q2 = 0.01) in Figure E1 and an overly
unrealistic assumption (q2 = 0.09) in Figure E2. The rest of this section describes the
individual studies providing evidence for certain q2 values.
Rouder and Haaf (2018, p. 21) discuss the relation between the two sources of
variance in psychophysics. Their formulas are identical to ours when changing the
notation from σ2effect to σ2β and σ2 to σ2. They argue that reasonable values in
psychophysics settings are σeffect = 28 ms and σ = 300, which leads to
q2 = σ2effect/σ2 = 0.009, (first row in table E1).
In accordance with this result, our replication based on Dehaene et al. (1998) also
produced the estimated the ratio to be qˆ2 = (6.7ms/78ms)2 = 0.007.
Other studies did not discuss the ratio between the two variances σ2effect and σ2
but only the trial-by-trial error variability σ2 . This alone is not sufficient to determine
q2. However, we use these values by combining them with the reported statistics from
Dehaene et al. (1998). This is possible because there is only one degree of freedom:
Knowing q2 or σ2 is interchangeable when reanalyzing one study. Specifically, Dehaene
et al. (1998) noted that σˆ2∆ˆi = σˆ
2
effect + 2M σˆ
2
 = (13.5 ms)2 in a setting with M = 256. To
uniquely identify σˆ2effect and σˆ2 we only need either qˆ2 or σˆ2 . Thus, we first estimate the
between-subjects variance, σˆ2effect = (13.5 ms)2 − 2M σˆ2 , and then the ratio parameter,
q2 = σˆ2effect/σˆ2 . This way, we determined q2 from the following three studies and
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obtained the values shown in Table E1.
Miller and Ulrich (2013) suggested σ = 92 ms in a binary forced-choice task
(without masked stimuli). Combining this with Dehaene et al.’s results as just described
yields σeffect = 10.8 ms and therefore q2 = 0.014.
Jensen (1992) report an average estimate of σˆ = 91 ms measured in N = 863 nine
to twelve year olds yielding q2 = 0.014. Ribeiro, Paiva, and Castelo-Branco (2016)
report σˆ = 79 ms in a speeded binary choice task without priming suggesting
q2 = 0.021. Even though the specific tasks and populations from these two studies do
not match our setting exactly, it is plausible that variances are comparable.
Even though we only discussed behavioral data, the situation is more extreme
(smaller q) for EEG and fMRI data because single-trial event related potentials (ERPs)
or blood-oxygen-level-dependent signals (BOLD signals) incorporate much more noise
(Stahl, Gibbons, & Miller, 2010). Thus, the ratio between effect vs. noise variance in
these measures will be even smaller justifying our choice of q2 = 0.0225.
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Figure E1 . Reanalysis with q2 = 0.01. Same as Figure 5 assuming that the standard deviation of
true sensitivities across participants is SD[d′true,i] = q = 0.1. This assumption matches the results of our
replication and is therefore more realistic but also more strict in dismissing results of an indirect task
advantage (ITA). Here, only 7 reanalyzed ITAs are confirmed while also 3 results yield the opposite
result of a larger sensitivity in the direct task (direct task advantage [DTA]). Error bars represent
95%-confidence intervals.
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Figure E2 . Reanalysis with q2 = 0.09. Same as Figure 5 assuming that the standard deviation of
true sensitivities across participants is SD[d′true,i] = q = 0.3. With this or even larger q2, reanalyzed
sensitivities tend to become clearly larger in the indirect compared to the direct task. However, this
assumption is clearly unrealistic. First, in the direct task, this would mean that a substantial
percentage of participants had a true sensitivity of d′true,i = 0.5 or higher indicating that they could
discriminate the masked stimuli better than 60%-correct. In the indirect task, an unrealistic
implication of this assumption is that, in the study of Dehaene et al. (1998), trial-by-trial reaction times
(RTs) would be estimated to vary with a standard deviation of only ±43 ms (within-subject variance
σ2 = 432) even though RTs typically vary more than ±80 ms from trial to trial, see Appendix E.
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Appendix F
Details on reanalyzed studies
For each study, we give an overview of the study’s structure, indicate in a table which
values we extracted and explain our decisions for in- and exclusion of particular results.
We only used results that follow the standard reasoning and fit into our reanalysis
method. We use the following abbreviations:
NR Not reanalyzable: Reported statistics do not match our reanalysis method. For
example when the congruency factor has more than two levels (congruent,
incongruent, and neutral) or when there are additional between-subject factors.
NIE No indirect effect: The study attempted to find an ITA but failed due to a
non-significant indirect task result. In such cases, the studies usually abort the
standard reasoning, such that these cases are not relevant for us.
RTM Regression to the mean: The study excluded participants with good direct-task
performance (cf. Box 2 of why this is problematic). In these cases we still
reanalyzed the reported results. Note that our reanalysis can be expected to
confirm an ITA even when the underlying sensitivities are equal.
SR Standard reasoning: We included quotes from the reanalyzed studies indicating
that they adhere to the standard reasoning.
We report the number N of participants, the total number of observed trials, and
the reported statistic of the original study. Additionally, we report the sensitivities and
standard errors of our reanalysis. These are the values from Figure 5a. We then report
the differences in sensitivities and their standard errors; here the difference is always
taken between the current row’s indirect task compared to the previously reported direct
task. These results are presented in Figure 5b. We abbreviate Experiment 1 by E1, etc.
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Damian (2001). The study reports four experiments but concludes an ITA
only in Experiment 1 and 4. Experiments 2 and 3 were NIE.
SR: “Two control experiments investigated participants’ ability to consciously
perceive the masked primes. It was shown that performance was at chance level on both
presence-absence judgments and on a number vs. random letter string discrimination
task when the temporal characteristics of a trial were identical to those of the main
experiment. Thus, the congruity effect described above must indeed have occurred
outside of the participants’ awareness” (p. 1).
Table F1
Reported results from Damian (JEP:HPP, 2001)
Original data Our reanalysis (Figure 5)
N no. of trials Statistic d′estimated ± SE d′diff ± SEdiff
Direct (E1) 16 96 d′ = 0.064 0.06± 0.07
Indirect, RT (E1) 16 120 F (1, 15) = 6.15 0.14± 0.07 0.07± 0.10
Indirect, error rate (E1) 16 120 F (1, 15) = 13.8 0.21± 0.07 0.14± 0.10
Direct (E4) 16 96 d′ = 0.117 0.12± 0.07
Indirect, RT (E4) 16 120 F (1, 15) = 5.67 0.13± 0.07 0.02± 0.10
Indirect, ER (E4) 16 120 F (1, 15) = 5 0.13± 0.07 0.01± 0.10
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Dehaene et al. (1998). The study reported two direct tasks and three indirect
tasks. From the two direct tasks, we consider only the second direct task (word vs.
digit discrimination) because it fits the neutral criterion assumption and it also shows
lower sensitivity (d′ = 0.2 in the first and d′ = 0.3 in the second task). This way, we
favor confirming the ITA hypothesis. For the first indirect measure, we computed the t
value from the given estimates for the congruency effect (M = 24 ms and SD = 13.5).
For the second indirect measure, the statistic (t(11) < 3) is taken from Figure 4, where
the covert activation reflects processing of the prime as opposed processing of the target
in the overt activation. For the third indirect measure, we only considered the
congruency effect on fMRI the results are provided in Figure 5.
Table F2
Reported results from Dehaene et al. (Nature, 1998)
Original data Our reanalysis (Figure 5)
N no. of trials Statistic d′estimated ± SE d′diff ± SEdiff
Direct, word vs. digit 7 112 d′ = 0.2 0.20± 0.11
Indirect, RT 12 512 t(11) = 6.16 0.29± 0.09 0.09± 0.14
Indirect, EEG (LRP) 12 512 t(11) = 3 0.14± 0.06 −0.06± 0.12
Indirect, fMRI 9 128 F (1, 8) = 6.23 0.17± 0.10 −0.03± 0.14
WHEN CAN SCIENTISTS CLAIM AN ITA? 70
Dehaene et al. (2001). The study reports two experiments. In E1, multiple
measures assessed the visibility of the masked stimulus and we chose the reported
binary forced-choice task (no stimulus vs. masked stimulus) because it is the most
relevant result. In this experiment, the ITA refers to the absence vs. presence of the
masked stimuli. The fMRI results in E1 were NR. In E2, the ITA referred to the the
congruency effect of repeated (congruent, either in same or in different case) vs.
different words (incongruent).
SR: “Behaviorally, participants again denied seeing the primes and were unable to
select them in a two-alternative forced-choice test [...]. However, case-independent
repetition priming was observed in response times recorded during imaging [...]”
(p. 755) and “As this phenomenon depends only on the identity of the masked prime,
specific information about word identity must have been extracted and encoded
unconsciously [...]” (p. 756).
Table F3
Reported results from Dehaene et al. (Nat. Neuro., 2001)
Original data Our reanalysis (Figure 5)
N no. of trials Statistic d′estimated ± SE d′diff ± SEdiff
Direct (E1) 27 36 52.9%-correct 0.15± 0.09
Indirect, EEG, P1 (E1) 12 300 t(11) = 2.04 0.10± 0.06 −0.04± 0.10
Indirect, EEG, N1 (E1) 12 300 F (1, 11) = 9.79 0.16± 0.07 0.01± 0.11
Direct (E2) 10 64 53.6%-correct 0.18± 0.11
Indirect, RT (E2) 10 480 F (1, 9) = 36 0.30± 0.10 0.12± 0.15
Indirect, fMRI, same-case (E2) 10 240 t(9) = 1.98 0.34± 0.11 0.16± 0.16
Indirect, fMRI, different-case (E2) 10 240 t(9) = 2.68 0.34± 0.11 0.16± 0.16
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Finkbeiner and Palermo (2009). The study reported four experiments.
Prime and target stimuli were presented in different locations to the participants. In
half of the trials the prime location was cued (pc) and in the other half it was the target
location (tc). We excluded the target cued condition in E1 because it was NIE. In E3,
multiple within factors were tested but since those do not change the reported F value
of the congruency effect we could nevertheless reanalyze it. E4 did not follow the
standard reasoning.
Table F4
Reported results from Finkbeiner & Palermo (Psych. Sci., 2009)
Original data Our reanalysis (Figure 5)
N no. of trials Statistic d′estimated ± SE d′diff ± SEdiff
Direct, pc (E1) 40 80 d′ = 0.22 0.22± 0.05
Indirect, RT, pc (E1) 40 80 F (1, 39) = 33.94 0.24± 0.05 0.02± 0.07
Direct, pc (E2) 40 80 d′ = −0.06 −0.06± 0.05
Indirect, RT, pc (E2) 40 80 F (1, 39) = 8.5 0.12± 0.05 0.18± 0.07
Direct, tc (E2) 40 80 d′ = 0.07 0.07± 0.05
Indirect, RT, tc (E2) 40 80 F (1, 39) = 10.6 0.14± 0.05 0.07± 0.07
Direct (E3) 20 240 d′ = 0.05 0.05± 0.05
Indirect, RT (E3) 20 720 F (1, 19) = 31.37 0.20± 0.05 0.15± 0.07
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Finkbeiner (2011). The study presented trials in two conditions, one with a
short (40 ms) and one with a long (50 ms) prime presentation duration. An ITA was
concluded only for the short duration and with respect to the semantic content (not
color).
SR: “In contrast, 16 of the 21 subjects were judged to be at chance with the 40-ms
primes. Following Rouder et al. (2007), the RTs for the 17 subject-by-prime-duration
combinations for which subliminality was confirmed were entered into a paired-samples
t test (two-tailed) to determine whether subliminal priming had occurred” (p. 1260).
Table F5
Reported results from Finkbeiner (AP&P, 2011)
Original data Our reanalysis (Figure 5)
N no. of trials Statistic d′estimated ± SE d′diff ± SEdiff
Direct, 40 ms 21 120 d′ = 0.098 0.10± 0.06
Indirect, RT, 40 ms 21 80 t(20) = 2.5 0.14± 0.06 0.04± 0.09
Kiefer (2002). The study reported two experiments. E1 reported the indirect
task results and E2 reported the direct task results. In E1, indirect effects on RT, error
rates and some EEG components were NR because the reported statistics combine
masked and unmasked conditions (for unmasked conditions, they claimed no ITA)
except for the N400 component in EEG. In E2, there were multiple direct tasks (see
their Table 1). We chose the direct task on semantic judgment because the indirect
task’s congruency effect was an effect from semantic relatedness too.
SR: “Average d′ measures in all tasks and context conditions did not deviate
significantly from zero demonstrating that masked words were not identified” (p. 36).
Table F6
Reported results from Kiefer (Cog. Brain Res., 2002)
Original data Our reanalysis (Figure 5)
N no. of trials Statistic d′estimated ± SE d′diff ± SEdiff
Direct, semantic (E2) 24 80 d′ = 0.14 0.14± 0.06
Indirect, EEG, N400 (E1) 24 320 F (1, 23) = 5.48 0.09± 0.04 −0.05± 0.08
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Kunde et al. (2003). The study reported four experiments. In E1, there were
multiple direct task measures from which we chose the one that fit our model
assumptions of a neutral criterion (the identification rate is not comparable by our
method). Also in E1, we chose not to consider sub-analyses of the indirect effects
because they are essentially repetitions of the same comparison. In E2, we did not
consider the non-target set condition and in E3 we did not consider the error rate
analysis as they were NIE. In E1-E3, trials with neutral primes were not considered for
calculating the priming effect.
SR: “The identification rate for the prime numbers was 2.2% (the chance level is
6.25% as each prime is presented four times in the 64 test trials). Thus, the primes were
indeed unidentifiable, as is usually found under the experimental conditions that we
adopted (Damian, 2001; Dehaene et al., 1998; Koechlin et al., 1999; Naccache &
Dehaene, 2001)” (p. 230).
Table F7
Reported results from Kunde et al. (Cogn., 2003)
Original data Our reanalysis (Figure 5)
N no. of trials Statistic d′estimated ± SE d′diff ± SEdiff
Direct (E1) 12 64 d′ = 0.29 0.29± 0.10
Indirect, RT (E1) 12 1152 F (1, 11) = 25.17 0.22± 0.07 −0.07± 0.12
Direct (E2) 12 64 d′ = 0.33 0.33± 0.10
Indirect, RT, target set (E2) 12 288 F (1, 11) = 15.24 0.20± 0.07 −0.13± 0.12
Indirect, error rate, target set (E2) 12 288 F (1, 11) = 6.35 0.13± 0.06 −0.20± 0.12
Direct (E3) 12 64 d′ = −0.11 −0.11± 0.10
Indirect, RT, target set (E3) 12 144 F (1, 11) = 21.67 0.28± 0.09 0.39± 0.14
Indirect, RT, non-target set (E3) 12 144 F (1, 11) = 6.58 0.15± 0.08 0.26± 0.13
Direct (E4) 24 64 d′ = 0.22 0.22± 0.07
Indirect, RT (E4) 24 1152 F (1, 23) = 43.2 0.21± 0.05 −0.01± 0.08
Indirect, error rate (E4) 24 1152 F (1, 23) = 9.17 0.10± 0.04 −0.12± 0.08
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Mattler (2003). The study reports five experiments. Only Experiments 3 and
5 are considered to be evidence for unconscious priming. Experiment 3 suffers severely
from RTM and therefore not reanalyzed.
SR: “We might assume that performance at chance level indexes absence of all
conscious information. This assumption was made in a number of studies (e.g., Dehaene
et al., 1998; Klotz & Neumann, 1999; Neumann & Klotz, 1994; Vorberg et al., in press).
In the present study, evidence for priming without awareness comes from Experiment 3
and Experiment 5, in which participants showed substantial non-motor priming effects
although they could not discriminate primes better than chance” (p. 184)
Table F8
Reported results from Mattler (P & P., 2003)
Original data Our reanalysis (Figure 5)
N no. of trials Statistic d′estimated ± SE d′diff ± SEdiff
Direct (E5) 11 320 d′ = 0.28 0.28± 0.06
Indirect, RT (E5) 11 320 F (1, 10) = 18.5 0.22± 0.08 −0.06± 0.10
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Naccache and Dehaene (2001). The study reports two experiments. For the
direct tasks in both experiments, the authors additionally conducted the Greenwald
method which has been criticized before (Klauer, Greenwald, & Draine, 1998; Merikle &
Reingold, 1998). Therefore, we only considered typical results as in all other studies.
We considered only the main congruency effects on RT and no further subanalyses
because the reported direct task would not have been comparable.
SR: “In this task, subjects performed at chance level, while priming effects were
replicated. This study provides strong evidence for the unconscious nature of our
semantic priming effects” (p. 227).
Table F9
Reported results from Naccache & Dehaene (Cogn., 2001)
Original data Our reanalysis (Figure 5)
N no. of trials Statistic d′estimated ± SE d′diff ± SEdiff
Direct (E1) 18 32 d′ = 0.6 0.60± 0.11
Indirect, RT (E1) 18 384 F (1, 17) = 21.99 0.19± 0.06 −0.41± 0.12
Direct (E2) 18 64 d′ = 0.01 0.01± 0.08
Indirect, RT (E2) 18 384 F (1, 17) = 21.62 0.19± 0.06 0.18± 0.10
Naccache et al. (2002). The study reported three experiments. We did not
consider the subanalyses for cued trials as the standard reasoning only related to the
congruency effects. Note that we only counted the number of “critical” trials which
were used in their analysis.
Table F10
Reported results from Naccache et al. (Psych. Sci., 2002)
Original data Our reanalysis (Figure 5)
N no. of trials Statistic d′estimated ± SE d′diff ± SEdiff
Direct (E1) 12 240 d′ = −0.04 −0.04± 0.06
Indirect, RT (E1) 12 240 F (1, 11) = 7.88 0.15± 0.07 0.19± 0.09
Direct (E2) 12 240 d′ = −0.07 −0.07± 0.06
Indirect, RT (E1) 12 240 F (1, 11) = 7.32 0.14± 0.07 0.21± 0.09
Direct (E3) 12 240 d′ = 0.09 0.09± 0.06
Indirect, RT, early, valid (E3) 12 240 F (1, 11) = 9.23 0.16± 0.07 0.07± 0.09
Indirect, RT, late, valid (E3) 12 240 F (1, 11) = 3.97 0.11± 0.06 0.02± 0.09
Indirect, RT, late, invalid (E3) 12 240 F (1, 11) = 5.34 0.12± 0.07 0.03± 0.09
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Pessiglione et al. (2007). The study deviated from the standard priming
paradigm by just showing masked stimuli (in this case, coins) and no target stimuli.
Presentation duration was varied in three conditions. For the separate conditions,
participants were measured in one direct task and with three indirect measures. The
appendix provided the required information for our reanalysis. We digitized their
Figure S2 to derive at the t values for the two indirect measures grip force and pallidal
activation. The third indirect measure, skin conductance, was NIE. Even though these
results were only reported in the appendix, the study bases their interpretation on these
results Note that N = 24 relates to 24 participant × stimulus duration conditions in
which the direct task was non-significant at an individual level. RTM.
SR: “Based on the percentage of correct responses, the analysis could then be
restricted to all situations where subjects guess at chance level about stimulus identity
(fig. S2). Even in these situations, pallidal activation and hand-grip force were
significantly higher for pounds as compared to pennies [...] These results indicate that
motivational processes involved in boosting behavior are qualitatively similar, despite
whether subjects are conscious or not of the reward at stake.” (p. 906).
Table F11
Reported results from Pessiglione et al. (Science, 2007)
Original data Our reanalysis (Figure 5)
N no. of trials Statistic d′estimated ± SE d′diff ± SEdiff
Direct, Semantic (E2) 24 60 d′ = 0.19 0.19± 0.07
Indirect, grip force 24 90 t(23) = 2.92 0.15± 0.06 −0.04± 0.09
Indirect, pallidal activation 24 90 t(23) = 3.41 0.17± 0.06 −0.02± 0.09
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Sumner (2008). The study reported two experiments. Both, E1 and E2, had
different mask conditions (A vs. B). Only E1 provided the indirect task results such
that we could reanalyze both conditions separately. For E2 we had to apply our
reanalysis to both conditions aggregated. Therefore, we averaged over the given d′
values from both conditions. We did not consider the subanalyses on the difference and
interaction between the two masks but only to the congruency effects as done in the
standard reasoning. RTM.
Table F12
Reported results from Sumner (Exp. Psych., 2008)
Original data Our reanalysis (Figure 5)
N no. of trials Statistic d′estimated ± SE d′diff ± SEdiff
Direct, mask A (E1) 12 40 d′ = 0.14 0.14± 0.12
Indirect, RT, mask A (E1) 12 200 t(11) = 5.5 0.30± 0.10 0.16± 0.15
Direct, mask B (E1) 12 40 d′ = 0.11 0.11± 0.12
Indirect, RT, mask B (E1) 12 200 t(11) = 4.5 0.25± 0.09 0.14± 0.15
Direct, mask B (E2) 12 80 50.5%-correct 0.03± 0.09
Indirect, RT (E2) 12 400 t(11) = 7.4 0.36± 0.10 0.33± 0.14
Indirect, error rate (E2) 12 400 t(11) = 4 0.19± 0.07 0.17± 0.12
van Gaal et al. (2010). The study reported one experiment with one direct
task and multiple indirect measures. However, we only considered the indirect effect on
RTs as the fMRI analyses were NR. RTM.
SR: “[...] a, Participants were unable to discriminate between trials with a
strongly masked square or diamond, as revealed by chance-level performance in a
two-choice discrimination task administered after the main experiment. b, Although
strongly masked no-go signals could not be perceived consciously, they still triggered
inhibitory control processes, as revealed by significantly longer response times on these
trials than on strongly masked go trials.” (in Figure 2, p. 4145).
Table F13
Reported results from van Gaal et al. (JoNeuro, 2010)
Original data Our reanalysis (Figure 5)
N no. of trials Statistic d′estimated ± SE d′diff ± SEdiff
Direct 20 48 d′ = 0.118 0.12± 0.09
Indirect, RT 20 240 t(19) = 6.24 0.27± 0.06 0.15± 0.11
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Wang et al. (2017). The study reported two experiments. In E1, there were
two outline conditions, line vs. rectangle. The line condition yielded a negative
congruency effect which we treated similar to a standard (positive) priming effect. The
rectangle condition was NIE. In E2, the rectangle condition with prime duration of
50 ms produced a large d′ so that no ITA was claimed. Hence, we only considered the
rectangle condition only for 33 ms. For the line condition, 33 ms and 50 ms trials were
analyzed together since there was no interaction effect.
SR: “The results from the FC task indicated that similar prime visibility,
equivalent to chance level, was obtained in the two preposed object type conditions.
This finding confirmed that primes were processed subliminally in the primary task”
(p. 425).
Table F14
Reported results from Wang et al. (Exp. Psych., 2017)
Original data Our reanalysis (Figure 5)
N no. of trials Statistic d′estimated ± SE d′diff ± SEdiff
Direct (E1) 15 64 d′ = 0.02 0.02± 0.09
Indirect, RT, line (E1) 15 208 F (1, 14) = 6.86 0.13± 0.06 0.11± 0.11
Direct, 33 ms, rect. (E2) 15 32 d′ = 0.15 0.15± 0.12
Indirect, RT, 33 ms, rect. (E2) 15 208 F (1, 14) = 8.15 0.14± 0.06 −0.01± 0.14
Direct, 33 ms + 50 ms, line (E2) 15 64 d′ = −0.103 −0.10± 0.09
Indirect, RT, 33 ms + 50 ms, line (E2) 15 416 F (1, 14) = 11.47 0.15± 0.06 0.25± 0.11
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Wójcik et al. (2019). The study reported one experiment with masked and
unmasked conditions. We only considered the masked condition for which an ITA was
claimed but not the unmasked condition. In the direct task, we had to compute average
d′ from the openly accessible material. In the indirect task, EEG components were
measured. For EEG preprocessing, some trials had to be rejected leading to an average
of 131 trials.
SR: “Analysis of the sensitivity measure d′ indicated that faces were not
consciously identified in the masked condition. A clear N2 posterior-contralateral
(N2pc) component (a neural marker of attention shifts) was found in both the masked
and unmasked conditions, revealing that one’s own face automatically captures
attention when processed unconsciously” (in the abstract, p. 471).
Table F15
Reported results from Wójcik et al. (Psych. Sci., 2019)
Original data Our reanalysis (Figure 5)
N no. of trials Statistic d′estimated ± SE d′diff ± SEdiff
Direct, masked 18 160 d′ = 0.211 0.21± 0.06
Indirect, EEG, N2pc, masked 18 131 t(17) = 2.34 0.12± 0.06 −0.09± 0.08
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Appendix G
Glossary
Variable Description
cj Condition effect, for example the congruent condition (j = 1) produces
faster RTs so that c1.
d′ Observed, average sensitivity index, measures the true sensitivity d′true.
d′i Observed, individual sensitivity indices, measures the true, individual
sensitivities d′true,i.
d′true True sensitivity, d′true = ∆σ .
d′estimated Estimated sensitivity from the reported results in the direct
(d′estimated,direct) or indirect task (d′estimated,indirect).
d′true,i Individual sensitivity, d′true,i = ∆iσ .
∆ The true difference between conditions, ∆ = c2 − c1.
∆ˆ The observed, mean difference between conditions.
∆i Individual effects, ∆i = c2 + (p× c)i2 − (c1 + (p× c)i1), for example the
expected congruency effect between conditions of participant i.
∆ˆi The observed difference between conditions of participant i.
ijk trial-by-trial error, noise due to measurement error or random neuronal
fluctuations.
fopt(x) Optimal classifier taking indirect measures x (e.g., RTs) and predicting
the condition (congruent/incongruent).
ft(x) Threshold classifier taking predicting one condition for indirect measures
x ≤ t (e.g., RTs) and the other for x > t.
h Approximation used to translate between sensitivities and accuracies.
i Index for participant i ∈ {1, 2, ..., N}.
j Index for condition j ∈ {1, 2}, for example indicator for congruent (j = 1)
and incongruent (j = 2) conditions.
k Index for trial k ∈ {1, 2, ...,M}. Since there are two conditions, the
number of observed trials per participant is 2M .
κN,M,q2 Constant relating t values to the estimated sensitivity in the indirect
task, d′true = κN,M,q2 · t. It depends on N , M and q.
M Number of trials per participant × condition. The total number of trials
per participant is 2M .
µ Grand mean, for example the overall expected value of RTs.
N Number of participants.
Ω(x) Marginal, cumulative density distribution (CDF) over indirect measures
x.
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Variable Description
pi Participant effect, for example participants with a faster RTs than aver-
age have a negative pi while slower participants have a positive pi.
(p× c)ij Interaction effect, for example some participants have different reaction
time effects.
pi True accuracy.
pˆi Observed, mean accuracy.
pii True accuracy of participant i. It is can be translated into a sensitivity
by d′true,i = 2Φ−1(pii) where Φ is the cumulative normal distribution.
pˆii Observed, individual accuracy.
q2 Ratio between effect variance and trial-by-trial error variance,
q2 = σ
2
effect
σ2
. This is the variance of true sensitivities across individ-
uals, q2 = Var[d′true,i]. A reasonable value in our setting is q2 = 0.0225
implying SD[d′true,i] = 0.15.
SE Estimated standard error of the estimated sensitivity.
σ2∆i Variance of true individual effects, for example, to which degree partici-
pants vary in their congruency effect.
σ2∆ˆi
True variance of observed individual effects, for example, variance of the
observable congruency effects.
σˆ2∆ˆi
Estimated variance of observed individual effects. This is what scientists
get when computing the variance on the observable congruency effects
across participants.
σ2p×c Variance of the interaction effect, (p× c)ij.
σ2effect Variance of the effects ∆i, σ2effect = 4σ2p×c.
σ2 Variance of the trial-by-trial error, ijk.
t t value, in our context it comes from paired-t-tests between the two
conditions of the indirect task.
Yijk Response of participant i in condition j trial k from the direct (Y dirijk ) or
indirect task (Y indirijk ). The standard repeated measures ANOVA model
is Yijk = µ + pi + cj + (p× c)ij + ijk.
